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INTRODUCTION 
Modern designers of graphical user interfaces, or GUIs, have obtained 
design patent protection for creative computer software displays, a realm 
previously limited to copyright. The difference in protection is important. 
Design patents do not require copying, while copyright does. Design patents 
do not have a fair use defense, while copyright does. Design patents do not 
exclude protection of ideas, while copyright does. Finally, design patents do 
not apportion damages to the infringing component, while copyright does.  
Thus, a trend toward patenting is unsurprising. However, design patents 
for GUIs present some legal difficulties. Design patents should protect 
ornamental designs only, but user interfaces incorporate significant 
functional elements.1 First, functionality might include the “idea” of the 
invention; a design may be functional because it is so broadly construed that 
it covers any design implementing the same idea. Second, functionality 
might typically include the operation of the GUI; this is probably what most 
people think of as functional. Third, functionality might include customer 
expectations, ease of use, and ergonomics; this category is somewhat 
scientific, despite the fact that many armchair observers have opinions 
about what works in design and what doesn’t. 
To be sure, GUIs include creative design elements as well, but there is 
no clear dividing line between creativity and functionality in the current 
case law. Indeed, few courts or commentators have specifically weighed in 
on how design patents should apply to the mélange of functional and 
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1 Reyes Juárez-Ramírez, et al., Towards Improving User Interfaces: A Proposal for 
Integrating Functionality and Usability Since Early Phases, 2011 vol. 1  INT’L CONF. ON 
UNCERTAINTY REASONING AND KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 119, 119-121 (2011) 
(describing method of integrating usability design and program functionality of user 
interface).  As discussed in more detail below, determining what is ornamental is harder 
than it sounds. 
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ornamental features of GUIs. How should animations, such as a spinning 
cursor or a simulated page turn be treated? What about the overall design of 
the user screen? These questions, and more, have received little attention to 
date. Those few non-GUI cases attempting to separate functionality from 
ornamentality appear to rely on gut feelings more than analytical dissection. 
In many cases, courts leave the determination up to the jury with little 
guidance. 
These issues came to a head in the recent case of Apple v. Samsung. In 
that case, Apple sued Samsung for infringing –willfully, in fact—one of its 
design patents. The jury found infringement by several Samsung phones, 
and awarded hundreds of millions of dollars based on such infringement. 
The following figure is a side-by-side comparison of Samsung’s screen with 
Apple’s patent. 
 
The screens are not identical, but that’s not the standard. Instead, the 
standard is whether the ordinary observer would believe that the screen on 
the left is the same as the patented design. The jury decided: “Yes” and the 
District Court allowed the ruling to stand. In doing so, the Court explicitly 
ruled that it need not (indeed should not) instruct the jury about which 
functional aspects to include, disregard, or even consider. Though it was 
told it could disregard elements if it wanted, the jury was left to decide as it 
saw fit. 
For design patent neophytes, this comparison and the jury’s verdict 
usually leads to three questions that this article seeks to answer: 
 
1. Isn’t this something that should just be copyrighted? Why should there 
be a patent? The answer is relatively simple: the law has, since 1870, 
14-Aug-13] Functionality of GUI Design Patents 3 
contemplated dual protection. I trace the history to explain why the law 
could have evolved differently, but simply did not. 
2. Both of these screens change, both before and after sale. How can 
someone patent an ephemeral screen design? It also turns out that 
ephemeral designs have been protected for some time. Even so, I 
propose some limitations on the protection of GUIs that should address 
the special nature of GUI design patents. 
3. There are so many differences between these images. How can Apple 
patent the idea of square icons in a grid with a dock bar at the bottom? 
More intractable is determining when a design is infringing, and the role 
that functionality should play in that consideration. The bulk of this 
article is dedicated to answering this question. 
Examination of economic principles may help guide courts in deciding 
when a GUI is ornamental or not and how that fact should affect 
infringement determinations. These same economic principles applied to 
copyright disputes of the 1980’s and 1990’s, many of which were bitterly 
fought but now seem relatively well-settled. Nascent GUI designers used 
copyright law to protect the creative aspects of their designs. They did so 
with varying levels of success; some cases extended protection while some 
did not in seemingly opposed opinions. In prior work,2 I identified the 
principles underlying seemingly contradictory outcomes. Those principles 
helped settle the field—even if no one knew it was happening. Indeed, GUI 
copyright cases died off over time and are relatively rare today. 
The economic analysis begins with two propositions. 
First, courts are the gatekeepers to the proper level of copyright 
protection. As such, they maximize social value, but based on the facts 
before them, rather than attempting to maximize welfare ex ante with a veil 
of ignorance as to facts on the ground.  
Second, this intermediate, or delayed ex ante, optimization led to factors 
that considered the relationship of the parties and the importance of the 
particular software before the court, in addition to general encouragement 
of innovation by the parties and other software designers. This maintains 
dynamic efficiency, but uses more information as an input. 
Thus, courts should be—and are—more likely to find infringement in 
cases of market substitution, slavish copying, or breach of an economic 
relationship.   
                                                 
2 I reconciled these decisions in a previous article. Michael Risch, How Can Whelan v. 
Jaslow and Lotus v. Borland Both be Right? Re-Examining the Economics of Computer 
Software Reuse, 17 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. Law 511 (1999). 
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Also, courts should be—and are—less likely to find infringement or less 
likely to extend protections where customers benefit from compatibility. 
For example, where switching costs are high, either due to hardware costs 
or user training, courts will be more willing to allow reuse. Similarly, where 
the design becomes a de facto standard, courts may be more likely to allow 
others to use it. 
Further, courts should be—and are—less likely to extend protection 
where competitive principles favor compatibility. Courts will allow 
software that provides network connectivity or an application programming 
interface that allows software programs to exchange data.  
These three factors—substitution, customer needs, and competitive 
needs—explain virtually all, if not all, judicial copyright decisions relating 
to software reuse, including GUIs.3 
 This article considers whether the same economic analysis should apply 
to the burgeoning law of design patents. I submit that it does. In fact, though 
this article is limited to GUIs, the analysis could apply to any type of design 
patent where success drives imitation in the idea of the design, rather than 
the exact design itself. 
First, courts should be the gatekeepers of the ornamental/functional 
divide. They currently do so for bench trials, but have been hesitant to do so 
for jury trials. Thus, the groundwork is laid for courts to act as a gatekeeper 
in all cases. Judicial gatekeepers are an easier argument for copyright law 
because copyrights are not examined. As a result, copyright litigation is the 
first chance for an authoritative body to consider difficult questions.  
Because patents are examined, however, the PTO could weigh in on 
functionality, thus arguably alleviating the need for courts to do so. To be 
sure, examination necessarily shifts much of the analysis earlier than the 
infringement lawsuit, judges might still act as gatekeepers.  Because the 
importance of a GUI design can change over time, judges faced with 
competing products will be in a better position than patent examiners to 
assess future social welfare associated with protecting a GUI or allowing 
reuse.  
Second, courts hearing design patent cases should consider the same 
economic factors that are critical to copyright—substitution, customers, and 
competitors—when assessing design patent protection. They should do so 
because the same factors will maximize social welfare. They should also do 
so because these factors are consistent with the statutory requirements for 
ornamental protection. 
                                                 
3 For example, the analysis on pp. 30 relating to competitive need to reuse closely 
mirrors the facts and eventual outcome in the Oracle v. Google copyright trial. Michael 
Risch, Oracle v. Google: Digging Deeper, MADISONIAN (May 9, 2012), 
http://madisonian.net/2012/05/09/oracle-v-google-digging-deeper/.  
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This article proceeds in three parts: 
Part I briefly describes design patents, some important differences from 
copyright, and high grant rates. Part II introduces key concepts associated 
with GUI patents, namely functionality, ornamentality, and ephemerality. 
This part introduces the core concern: determining whether a GUI infringes 
a patent when it reuses some elements but does not copy the design exactly. 
Part III summarizes the economic considerations for determining when to 
allow reuse under copyright law. Part IV applies those considerations to 
design patent protection. First, it concludes that the same considerations 
should continue to apply to design patents, at least with respect to GUIs. 
Second, this part examines how the economic factors might apply to design 
patents. 
 
I.  DESIGN PATENT BASICS 
Design patents protect non-useful aesthetic product designs: “Whoever 
invents any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor. . . .”4 As discussed below, an 
“article of manufacture” currently includes parts of articles of manufacture, 
including the shape of just one side of a device,5 ornamental attachments to 
devices,6 and images appearing on devices.7  Protection lasts for 14 years 
from the date the patent is granted.8 In this sense, the protection for a patent 
is much shorter than for copyrights, which last for ninety-five years for 
corporate owned works.9 
With the shorter duration for design patents comes stronger protection.10 
First, unlike copyright, one need not copy to infringe.11 Any use of the 
design brings liability, and there is no independent development defense. 
Second, there is no fair use defense; any infringement brings liability, no 
                                                 
4 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
5 See, e.g., Patent No. D618,677 (filed Jan. 5, 2007) (claiming only front face of 
iPhone) 
6 See, e.g., Patent No. D618,244 (filed Oct. 19, 2009) (claiming “clip” that attaches to 
electronic device). 
7 See, e.g., Patent No. D675,639 (filed Sept. 19, 2011) (claiming portion of slide to 
unlock icon but nothing else) 
8 35 U.S.C. § 173. 
9 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
10 But see Sarah Burstein, Not (Necessarily) Narrower: Rethinking the Relative Scope 
of Copyright Protection for Designs, 3 IP THEORY 114 (2013) (arguing that design patents 
do not necessarily provide stronger protection than copyright). 
11 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 501 (defining infringement as violation of a right, for 
example, to make copies) with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (outlawing the making, using, or selling 
of an infringing product). 
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matter the nature.12 Third, design patents allow for much greater damages: 
all of the defendant’s profits.13 Copyright damages, on the other hand, allow 
the defendant to show that its profits were not due to the infringement.14  
A designed (pun intended) safeguard on the power of these patents is 
that they must survive the rigors of patent examination. Only those designs 
that are novel and non-obvious may be granted.  
But this safeguard provides no safety. It appears that examination fails 
to rigorously separate the wheat from the chaff. An examination of design 
patents granted shows a 90% grant rate,15 with an average pendency of 
merely 15 months (and only 13 months for the vast majority that were 
granted on the first office action).16 Pendency is slightly longer for GUI 
designs, at just under 19 months,17 but with pendency of less than one year 
in expedited procedures.18 In contrast, the average pendency of utility 
patents during the same time period was more than 4 years for the most 
common filing type.19  
To be sure, some of the pendency may be due to a better application to 
examiner ratio for design patents. On the other hand, design patents tend to 
cite a lot of prior art (20.6 mean, 13 median), and examiners added more 
than half of that prior art from their own searches (11 mean, 9 median).20 
Further, GUI design patents cited on average even more than the mean for 
all patents (24.6 mean, 16 median),21 and of those, examiners added nearly 
two-thirds of all references!22  
                                                 
12 35 U.S.C. §271(a). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 289. 
14 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
15 Dennis Crouch, Design Patent Prosecution, DESIGN PATENTS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD, at 24-25 (Conference Proceedings, Apr. 5, 2013) 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/final_new_pp
tx_658586_1-full_size-op-1.pdf 
16 Id. at 26. 
17 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *29 (reporting pendency for 
2012; the difference is statistically significant compared to other design patents).  
18 Id. 
19 Dennis Crouch, Update on Patent Pendency, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/04/average-pendancy-of-utility-patents-issued-april-
27-2010claim-priority-to-foreign-applicationyesnoclaim-priority-to-us-no.html. 
20 Reflects all issued patents since 2005. Data on file with author. The number of 
references cited has increased with time. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, 
at *34. 
21 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *36. The comparison is more 
striking given the timeframes. The averages I report are from 2005 to 2012, while Du Mont 
& Janis report since 1996. Du Mont & Janis note substantial growth in citations since 1996, 
which implies that an average dating to 1996 should be smaller than an average dating to 
2005, not larger. 
22 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *38. 
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Despite finding all of this relevant art,23 examiners almost never reject 
based on prior art. First, patents are rarely rejected. Only 19% of GUI 
Patents receive any rejection at all. The other 80+% issue unassailed.24 For 
GUI patents,25 less than fifteen percent of all rejections were based on 
novelty or obviousness.26 And applicants may well have surmounted those, 
since there were very, very few final rejections (60 out of about 556 
rejections since 1996).27 The numbers for animated designs are even more 
startling: not one single rejection based on novelty or obviousness. Ever (at 
least since animations were blessed in 2006).28 Taking all the data 
together,29 as few as 2.5% of patents received a prior art rejection of any 
kind.30  
It is clear that GUI patents are better examined than other design 
patents,31 and yet the “base” rejection rate is so low that even quadrupling it 
for GUIs provides almost no actual examination based on the prior art, 
despite the fact that examiners appear to have no problem finding more GUI 
prior art than any other kind.  As discussed further below, lax examination 
(and the court-defined obviousness rules that allow it) is problematic, given 
that no defenses allowing reuse currently exist. 
 
                                                 
23 By comparison, examiners add only 25% of the references for utility patents. Du 
Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *38 n 180. Despite this, novelty and 
obviousness rejections are far more frequent. Id. at *43 (noting studies that show 86% of 
utility patents receiving at least one rejection). 
24 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *42. 
25 Non-GUI design patents are virtually never rejected; only 3.37% of all rejections 
since 1996 were for novelty or obviousness, and of those, not one single rejection in the 
sample group cited novelty or obviousness. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 
41, at *44. 
26 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *44. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at *45. 
29 This calculation is necessarily an approximation, since there were more rejections 
than there were patents, meaning that some patents may have been responsible for multiple 
rejections. Further, file wrappers were not available for some patents, which I assume 
means no rejections. 
30 Du Mont and Janis report a more conservative number of 7.5%, based only on those 
patents with a file wrapper, whereas I consider all patents. Du Mont & Janis, Virtual 
Designs, supra note 41, at *46. Crouch, supra note 15, at 25, reports 1.2% rejection rate for 
all design patents. It is, of course, possible that other patent applications were rejected or 
abandoned based on prior art. However, the grant rate is 90%, so even if every single 
ungranted patent were rejected for prior art, the total percentage would still be very small. 
31 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *46 (“What we can say is that 
there is no support for the position that design patents on virtual designs are of dubious 
quality compared to other classes of design patents.”).  
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II. FUNCTIONALITY, ORNAMENTALITY, AND EPHEMERALITY 
Design patents protecting GUIs evoke important threshold questions 
relating to the protection of functional elements, or whether GUI elements 
are properly protected by design patents at all. 
The first design patent statute, enacted in 1842, envisioned protection 
for novel drawings and images incorporated into articles of manufacture.32 
The protection was extremely important for design protection at the time, 
because drawings, paintings, and photographs were not protected under the 
Copyright Act until 1870.33  
Meanwhile, the language of the design patent statute caused great 
distress. Because it protected “useful” designs, inventors obtained design 
patents on new shapes for well-known useful inventions. As the 
Commissioner of Patents stated in Ex Parte Crane,34 the first decision to 
interpret this part of the statute:  
 
The line of distinction between what is useful and what is merely 
ornamental is, in some cases, very indefinite. By some it is said that 
any form or design that is most useful, is also most pleasing. It 
would be impossible, in the view of such persons, to make any 
improvement in utility that did not at the same time add to the 
ornamental and artistic. 
I can perceive no necessity for the distinction. There is a large 
class of improvements in manufactured articles that are not regarded 
as new inventions, or as coming within the scope of general patent 
laws. They add to the market value and salability of such articles, 
and often result from the exercise of much labor, genius, and 
expense. They promote the best interests of the country, as well as 
the creations of inventive talent. It seems to me to have been the 
intent of Congress to extend to all such cases a limited protection 
and encouragement. Whenever there shall be produced by the 
exercise of industry, genius, effort and expense, any new and 
                                                 
32 Patent Act of August 29th, 1842, 5 Stat at Large543, § 3 (protecting any “new and 
useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or printed or 
painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article of manufacture….” 
33 Act of July 8, 1870, §§85-111, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198, 212-16; cf. 
Copyright, 3 Am. L. Rev. 453, 454-55 (“It was also contended that [the infringed stage 
play scenes], were not of a literary, but of a mechanical order, and not subject to the 
protection of the Statute of Copyright; and that the scene . . . must be protected by . . . 
design patents for the scenery and properties.”); Donald M. Millinger, Copyright and the 
Fine Artist, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (1980). 
34 Ex Parte Crane (Dec. Comm’r Patents Apr. 20, 1869) (patent granted on new 
arrangement of product that had already been denied a utility patent as non-novel: “). 
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original design, form, configuration or arrangement of a 
manufactured article, it comes within the provisions and objects of 
the act creating design patents, whatever be its nature, and whether 
made for ornament merely, or intended to promote convenience and 
utility.35 
 
This ruling led to the rise of so-called “patent sharks” that would extract 
payments from unsuspecting farmers using farm equipment that looked 
similar to new designs.36 
In 1902, the Commissioner of Patents requested that Congress eliminate 
the word “useful” from the statute, noting that design patents were never 
intended to protect functional equipment.37 Instead, the word “ornamental” 
was introduced into the statute, where it has remained until today.  
Early courts struggled with the amendment, but quickly settled on a rule 
that also still applies: if a design is primarily ornamental, then the fact that it 
has some functional elements will not disqualify it from protection.38 
                                                 
35 Id. See also Ex parte Bartholemew (Dec. Comm’r Patents Dec. 7, 1869) (“In thus 
denying that a new ‘shape or configuration’ of an article, whereby utility or convenience is 
promoted, is the proper subject of a patent, under the acts referred to, the office would 
seem to have involved itself in the absurdity that if a design is useless it may be patented, 
whereas if it be useful it is entitled to no protection. Fortunately . . . office is relieved from 
so grievous an imputation. . . . Articles have been, and are being constantly, patented as 
designs which possess no element of the artistic or ornamental, but are valuable solely 
because, by a new shape or configuration, they possess more utility than the prior forms of 
like articles.”). 
36 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and The Perils of 
Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1820-21 (2007); see also Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Patents for 1872 (Jan. 23, 1872) (“Very many design patents, which 
cannot, under the law, be denied, are a fraud upon the public. A man applies for a patent on 
a cultivator, or hammer, or any other useful tool or device, and finding himself fully 
anticipated in every principle and useful feature of his invention, abandons his application 
and at once applies for a design patent for the same thing. This application he bases upon 
some peculiarity of form or color, having nothing whatever to do with the merits or 
demerits of the article itself; and not being anticipated in these respects, a patent is granted 
for the new design. The patent gives him no protection whatever, except as to the form or 
color upon which it is based.”). 
37 U.S. Senate, Committee on Patents, Amending Section 4929, Revised Statutes (S. 
Rep. No. 1139). Apr. 15, 1902. 
38 Mygatt v. Zalinski, 138 F. 88, 89 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1905) (“That it is useful as well as 
ornamental does not affect its patentability as a design patent.”); compare Ashley v. 
Weeks-Numan Co., 220 F. 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1915)  (“[W]e declare that the subject-matter 
of a patent is not rendered unfit as a design patent by the mere fact that it is possible 
somewhere in its construction to discover a mechanical function.”) with Best Lock Corp. v. 
Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“However, if the design claimed 
in a design patent is dictated solely by the function of the article of manufacture, the patent 
is invalid because the design is not ornamental.”) 
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Another change in the 1902 amendment was the elimination of 
incorporation of pictures and drawings from the statute.39 The legislative 
history implies that the removal was of superfluous material,40 and since 
that time, designs patents with drawings have continued to issue. 
The 1902 amendment (and practice since that time) leads to the first two 
questions discussed above. 
 
A.  Should Design Patents Protect Purely Copyrightable Material? 
First, given that copyright law expanded to protect the previously 
unprotected pictorial and graphic works, perhaps design patents should not 
be used to protect such works separately from articles of manufacture. In 
other words, copyright might perform a channeling function to protect non-
product-based images. One favoring channeling might argue that design 
patent laws could not have been intended to protect copyrightable images 
from all uses without the benefit of fair use, independent creation, 
idea/process, or other defenses. 
The 1902 amendment has not received enough attention, at least not on 
this question. The 1842 inclusion of protection for pictures and drawings in 
design patents was instituted long before copyright protection protected 
such works. After copyright began protecting such works, Congress should 
have reconsidered design patent protection more explicitly, but it did not41 
and it has not.42 
At the time, the Commissioner of Patents foresaw a channeling 
function. In requesting the 1902 amendment, the Commissioner of Patents 
noted: 
 
It is thought that if the present bill shall become a law the subject of 
                                                 
39 Revised Stat. 4929, PL 57-109, 32 Stat. 193 (May 9, 1902). 
40 S. Rep. 1139, supra note 37; see also, Harold Binney, Present Status of the Law 
Relating to Designs, 25 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 662, 664 (1902) (arguing that changed 
language did not eliminate design patent protection for drawings and printed materials). 
41 Binney, supra note 40, at 662 (describing how new statute was passed within a one 
month period, with no input from any patent practitioners or other members of the public); 
In re Schnell, 46 F.2d 203, 205 (CCPA 1931) (holding that amendment did not change 
protection for application of pictoral works to manufactures), citing Ex Parte Fulda, 1913 
C.D. 206. 
42 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (failing to mention 1902 amendment: “We 
do hold that the [design] patentability of the statuettes, fitted as lamps or unfitted, does not 
bar copyright as works of art.”). Indeed, copyright thinking still struggles with drawings 
and photographs today, even without consideration of design patents. Rebecca Tushnet, 
The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012); Christine Haight Farley, The 
Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 385 (2004). 
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design patents will occupy its proper philosophical position in the 
field of intellectual production, having upon the one side of it the 
statute providing protection to mechanical constructions possessing 
utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright 
law, whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the 
position of protecting objects of new and artistic43 quality 
pertaining, however, to commerce, but not justifying their existence 
upon functional utility. If the design patent does not occupy this 
position there is no other well-defined position for it to take.44  
 
This quote could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it implies 
that there should be some channeling between artistic and commercial 
images. On the other hand, it implies that copyrighted works can be 
patented, so long as they are “artistic” (now ornamental) and part of a 
commercial design. 
In practice, both readings have applied. There are artistic works that do 
not qualify for patent protection, having been successfully channeled. 
Indeed, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) examination 
guidelines for computer icons45 makes clear that the difference between 
patentable and unpatentable images is a clear drawing and claim placing the 
image on a display screen or other object. Images not tied to display screens 
are not considered articles of manufacture.46 But the channeling is 
incomplete; one may surmount the “display” hurdle without any trouble 
whatsoever.47 For artistic works, a simple dotted line denoting attachment to 
some article of manufacture ends the inquiry. 
Thus, the notion that GUIs are copyrightable is unlikely to affect design 
patentability, even if it could have in 1902 or should today. 
 
B.  Are Ephemeral Interfaces Really Articles of Manufacture? 
Today, design patents cover images, and only images, displayed on a 
screen.48 As many claims are written, merely viewing an image on a blog 
                                                 
43 The commissioner’s proposed “artistic” requirement was changed to “ornamental” 
in the final statute. 
44 S. Rep. 1139, supra note 37. 
45 MPEP 1404.01(a). 
46 Id. 
47 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (allowing copyright or design patent 
protection of a functional lamp).  See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Progress and Competition in Design, __ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013) 
(arguing that design patents might be justified by integration of design and function, but 
cannot be justified to protect surface ornamentation).  
48 Apple Patents an Encircled Musical Note, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 25, 2012) (“The 
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page or in a PDF file associated with this article (which includes some 
patented images) would constitute infringement. From a theoretical point of 
view, something seems off about that: viewing an image on a display screen 
can hardly be considered an article of manufacture, yet the law outlaws 
precisely such use, even if one is simply viewing the patent itself on a 
computer!49 
Thus, the second threshold question is whether an ephemeral image, 
viewable anywhere and in any context, can be considered an “article of 
manufacture” under the statute. The guidelines, issued in 1996, give 
surprisingly little attention to this question. Courts have long held that 
“surface ornamentation” constitutes an article of manufacture,50 and 
displayed images are part of a surface. Thus, the guidelines only ask 
whether the image is part of a display, not whether an ephemeral image is 
they type of thing that should ever be protected. 
Even if one accepts that copyrightable works should be protected by 
design patent, this does not mean that all copyrightable expression qualifies 
for patent protection. Consider, for example, protection of structure, 
sequence, and organization of factual information. This may well be 
protected by copyright,51 but does not fall under the design patent umbrella. 
                                                                                                                            
question: Is Patently-O infringing the design patent by showing the image on your 
screen?”), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/apple-patents-an-encircled-musical-
note.html. 
49 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever … uses … any patented Invention … infringes the 
patent.”). Indeed, simply copying the patent on paper might be an article of manufacture; it 
is unclear whether the display screen is a binding limitation. Further, patents need not limit 
themselves, since designers could place the image any article of manufacture—like a 
coffee mug or t-shirt. 
50 Mygatt v. Zalinski, 138 F. 88 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1905) (reflector surface design); Phoenix 
Knitting Works v. Hygienic Fleeced Underwear Co., 194 F. 703, 706 (C.C.D. Pa. 1911) 
(“The alleged new design therefore may safely be said to reside in the surface 
ornamentation” of a neck scarf), aff’d on other grounds, 194 F. 696, 699 (3d Cir. 1912) 
(“The design must be ornamental when the scarf is on the neck of the wearer, and not be 
such as to only fulfill its purpose as an ornamental design when it is lying flat upon a 
table.”); Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Rosenbaum Co., 199 F. 154, 167 (D. Pa. 1912) (“The 
evidence shows that both the infringing [lamp] shade and the Evans shade were exhibited 
for sale while lighted, and it is while lighted that the proposed purchaser will observe 
them.”). See also, Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, The Origins of the American Design 
Patent System, 88 IND. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2013) (discussing surface ornamentation at 
foundation of design patent system); Jason J. Du Mont & Mark D. Janis, Virtual Designs, 
__ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __, at *4-*6 (forthcoming 2013) (discussing surface ornamentation 
rules). Indeed, the design patent that led to the rule that infringers must pay all of their 
profits as damages involved the surface design of a rug. Mark Lemley, A Rational System 
of Design Patent Remedies, __ STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226508. 
51 Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 710 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Kregos can obtain a 
copyright by displaying the requisite creativity in his selection of statistics. But if someone 
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This may seem like a silly comparison, but a comparison of the interface 
patents to infringing devices below will show that courts could allow 
protection of design structure rather than particular images in the future. 
Furthermore, protection of user interfaces essentially merges the 
copyright law’s fixation requirement with patent law’s article of commerce 
requirement. Fixation is the cornerstone of copyright: no work can be 
protected if it is not fixed in a tangible medium.52 But fixation is far from 
permanent; loading a file into computer memory is sufficiently fixed, even 
if the computer could be turned off or the memory changed.53 
The question, then, is whether any image present in computer 
memory—fixed, to be sure—becomes an “article of manufacture,” even if it 
is not displayed on the screen at all times. Thus far, the PTO has said yes, 
and courts have not asked the question, assuming that if a patent issued, 
then it must be an article of manufacture. Indeed, design patents now 
protect “animations,” which are a series of images that move in sequence, 
such as a spinning icon or a simulated folding of a page to emulate a book 
on a display screen.54 
Protection of displays appears to rest on two seminal cases issued by 
that Court of Customs & Patent Appeals, the precursor to the Federal 
Circuit. Both are cited by the PTO guidelines.55 The first case is In re 
Hruby,56 which held that the shape of water moving in a fountain could be a 
patented design, even though the water was moving and could be turned off. 
The court reasoned that the ornamental result (the water) was not fleeting, 
but was instead a predictable and permanent aspect of the fountain’s 
design.57  
The second precedent is In re Zahn,58 in which the CCPA ruled that a 
                                                                                                                            
else displays the requisite creativity by making a selection that differs in more than a trivial 
degree, Kregos cannot complain.”); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. Cal. 
1999) (“The prices listed are not mere listings of actual prices paid; rather, they are CDN's 
best estimate of the fair value of that coin. To arrive at this estimate, CDN employs the 
process described above that satisfies the ‘minimal degree of creativity’ demanded by the 
Constitution for copyright protection.”). 
52 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 101. 
53 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (loading 
software into RAM creates “fixed” copy). 
54 David Leason, Design Patent Protection for Animated Computer-Generated Icons 
91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 580, 585-87 (2009); MPEP § 1504.01(a)(IV); In re 
Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 423-24 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (holding that moving parts does not 
change patentability). 
55 MPEP § 1504.01(a)(I). 
56 373 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
57 Id. at 999 (“We . . . would add that the permanence of any design is a function of the 
materials in which it is embodied and the effects of the environment thereon.”). 
58 617 F.2d 261 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
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portion of a manufacture could be separated by a “broken line” to separate 
the new, protectable design from the preexisting remainder of the article.59 
Though the notion that a portion of an article could be patented is more than 
140 years old,60 the Zahn court’s broken line rule leads to the near ubiquity 
of broken lines in graphical displays that separate the image from the rest of 
the display.61 
Despite the apparent reasonableness of Hruby and Zahn with respect to 
the facts of those cases, their extension to user interfaces is troubling. 
Courts and commentators have simply not asked the difficult questions. 
Collapsing fixation, animation, and display screen into an “article of 
manufacture” leaves design patents on a very slippery slope.  
For example, there is no theoretical bar to protecting every displayed 
copyrightable work with a design patent. Every television show and movie 
is theoretically a novel and non-obvious design to be incorporated into 
display screens everywhere. Indeed, every photograph captured and 
displayed on every mobile device might be protected. Every doodle on an 
electronic Etch-a-Sketch could be patented. Any use of the material would 
be infringing, without any consideration of fair use, the ideas represented by 
the work, or even the first amendment.  
Further, and perhaps more unsettling, the only apparent reason why 
such claims have not been made before is that nobody thought to do so, 
because there is no body of law to avoid such an outcome.62 The PTO has 
almost no tools to reject small, or even large,63 snippets of movies. While 
only a single inventive design may be covered by a patent, multiple patents 
might be filed on different—but important—segments of audiovisual works, 
sufficient to block all downstream use with no fair use defense. A design 
patent protecting four or five screencaps from the famous Hitler Downfall 
movie scene would eliminate all claims to fair use of that short but 
endlessly entertaining parody clip.64 The PTO has no track record of 
                                                 
59 Id. at 269 (“While the design must be embodied in some articles, the statute is not 
limited to designs for complete articles, or ‘discrete’ articles, and certainly not to articles 
separately sold. . . . No sound authority has been cited for any limitation on how a design is 
to be embodied in an article of manufacture.”). Zahn involved a shank on a drill bit, and 
only the “ornamental” design of the shank was protected.  
60 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 521 (1871) (affirming patent on 
spoon and fork handles, but not the spoon/fork portion. 
61 Leason, supra note 54. 
62 And, to be fair, perhaps the cost of obtaining a patent. 
63 Patentees submit an average of 7 figures per patent, though one patent issued since 
2005 submitted as many as 216 figures. Data on file with author. 
64 Hitler Downfall Parodies: 25 Worth Watching, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2009), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6262709/Hitler-Downfall-parodies-25-worth-
watching.html. Two of my personal favorites are Hitler learns his teaching schedule, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLC7Q3DTzi4, and Hilter is Furious at the Supreme 
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rigorously examining images to determine whether they are novel or 
obvious. Even if it did, the exact combination of images in that screen are 
unlikely to appear elsewhere. 
This parade of horribles might be solved in two ways. First, courts could 
recognize that an article of manufacture (or portion thereof) requires more 
than copyright fixation. Instead, an article of manufacture requires 
permanence at the point of manufacture, display, and use. To be sure, many 
elements might be hidden at one point or another, such as bottoms of 
drawers, collapsible devices, folding elements that become hidden, or even 
water fountains. But each of these examples is different in kind from the 
ephemeral images on a display screen. Ephemeral images can be configured 
by moving bits in memory, and as such, they are not ornamental articles of 
manufacture; instead, they are displays of information. In short, the PTO’s 
1996 concern about patenting of images was well-founded, but the solution 
was not to add “on a display screen” to patent claims. Instead, the solution 
was to recognize that images divorced from manufacture do not qualify as 
articles – they can be shown on any article, any screen, and any device, and 
that is not what design patents are meant to protect.65  
 A second solution might recognize that modern commercial products 
live under a big tent. As such, there may be times when the design of the 
product includes designs on the screen. However, protection for displayed 
surface designs should be limited in a number of ways to ensure that the 
design is an ornamental article of manufacture, rather than an ephemeral 
image.  
 
1. Limitation: Original Manufacture and Distribution 
First, such designs should be limited to the original manufacture and 
distribution of devices that include the image. This would exclude 
protection for images introduced on devices after manufacture and sale. It 
would also exclude infringement by the display of images unassociated with 
the original product, such as broadcast images or photographs.  
Design patent owners would surely object to this limitation; they would 
argue that it would allow competitors to “copy” their designs by 
downloading images to existing devices at some later date.  And they would 
be right – some newly developed icon, screen organization or other design 
                                                                                                                            
Court for Granting Cert to Bilski, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMszkJC6v9M. 
65 But see, Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *10-12 (discussing 
drawing of Peter Rabbit for use on many types of products and design patents for type fonts 
that can be patented without consideration of a display screen);  Adobe Sys. Inc. v. 
Southern Software Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1827, 1832-33 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that type 
fonts are design and software that displays this is article of manufacture). 
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could be used by others who do not produce them as an article of 
manufacture.66 In other words, if the broken line is critical to show that the 
design is part of a display then distribution of the image separated from that 
display cannot be an article of manufacture, even under existing law. Just as 
Hruby’s water-fountain shape is protected because some underlying 
mechanics reliably created it, his design would not be protected if one could 
replicate the water movement through some other form of water 
manipulation that did not involve a manufacture.67 
Limiting protection (and infringement) to original manufacture and 
distribution would not destroy the incentives of the design patent statute. In 
fact, such limitations have been suggested before as part of a proposal to 
encourage innovation.68 Companies would still have an incentive to design 
novel displays, because competitors could not use those displays in their 
product designs. This would provide a competitive advantage at the point of 
sale. Presumably, rules could be developed that stop competitors from 
avoiding the rule by selling empty devices that are updated soon after sale. 
 
2. Limitation: Rigorous Obviousness Rules 
Second, if displayed images are protected as articles of manufacture, 
then the PTO must rigorously examine such applications and actually reject 
some on novelty and obviousness bases. This is easier said than done for 
legal and practical reasons. Legally, the obviousness rules for design patents 
are incredibly permissive; virtually nothing is obvious.69 Thus, examiner 
hands are tied to some extent. 
The rigid rules for finding obviousness must be read to be believed. The 
                                                 
66 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (requiring design patent 
infringement to be determined at the point of sale: “[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, 
giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if 
the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one 
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”); but see, 
Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(requiring infringement analysis at any time during normal use lifetime of the product, not 
just the time of sale). 
67 See, e.g., M. Night Shyamalan, The Last Airbender (2010) (character shapes water 
using telekinesis). Indeed, the Hruby Court made clear that the patentee was in the 
“fountain selling” business – it wasn’t selling “water,” but instead the underlying pumps 
and hoses. In re Hruby, 373 F.2d 997, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
68 Frank W. Dahn, Designs – Patents or Copyrights, 10 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 297, 298 
(1928) (describing proposed legislation to limit design protection to sale of designed 
article). 
69 Crouch, supra note 15, at 25. But see Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 
566 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction based on 
probably finding of obviousness). 
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rules require a prior design that is nearly identical to the patented design 
before the analysis can even begin. The court in Apple v. Samsung70 
describes it clearly: 
 
To determine whether ‘one of ordinary skill would have combined 
teachings of the prior art to create the same overall visual 
appearance as the claimed design,’ the finder of fact must employ a 
two-step process.” [] “First, ‘one must find a single reference, a 
something in existence, the design characteristics of which are 
basically the same as the claimed design.’” [] “Second, ‘other 
references may be used to modify [the primary reference] to create a 
design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed 
design.’” [] “However, the ‘secondary references may only be used 
to modify the primary reference if they are so related to the primary 
reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one 
would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”71 
 
This two-step test is limiting in two ways: a) it stacks the deck in favor 
of validity by requiring that one piece of prior art is basically the same as 
the patented design, and b) it only allows combination upon specific 
suggestion.72 Hupp v. Siroflex73 is illustrative. In Hupp, the patentee 
claimed a stamp used to make concrete look like stone. Other such stamps 
existed, but not in the design claimed by the inventor. At trial, the jury 
found that the primary reference was a series of ceramic tiles that looked 
like Hupp’s design—at least the design of the concrete once it was stamped. 
Hupp argued that even if one saw ceramic tiles of the same pattern, it would 
not render a stamp to make that pattern obvious. The court agreed, ruling 
that: “We have been directed to no teaching or suggestion to a person of 
ordinary skill to look to a floor tile construction and convert it into the 
design of a mold to make a concrete simulated stone outdoor walkway.”74 
In Hupp, even an identical design was not enough, because the rules 
assumed that no designer would convert a tile design to a stone stamp 
design, even knowing that other stamp designs were available on the 
                                                 
70 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a Matter of 
Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHK 
(Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013). 
71 Id. at 6 (citations omitted), quoting in part Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 
Ltd., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
72 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *57 (arguing that current test is 
easily misapplied with respect to GUI patents). 
73 See, e.g., Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462-63 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(reversing a finding of obviousness of a stamp to create simulated. 
74 Id. at 1463. 
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market. Surely a stamp designer would think to make a new design in a 
stamp upon seeing a pleasing tile design; utility patent rules would find 
such a combination obvious.   
Thus, although design patents are examined under the same obviousness 
statute as utility patents,75 the rules do not seem to apply the same 
obviousness standards as utility patents.  
Indeed, the current design patent rule has its genesis in the Federal 
Circuit’s former “teaching-suggestion-motivation” test.76 The teaching-
suggestion-motivation test required some explicit suggestion in the prior art 
that references be combined. This, of course, is nearly impossible with 
designs, which are almost always depicted graphically, and thus cannot 
suggest or teach anything in the way that an academic article or patent 
might. This might account for the Federal Circuit’s two-step rule: requiring 
prior that is nearly identical is the only way to assure that there is a 
suggestion in a prior art. 
In addition to permissively allowing patents, both the two-step and the 
teaching-suggestion-motivation tests are rigidly applied, and outlaw the use 
of not only common creativity but also common sense. Such a rigid 
approach was unambiguously and unanimously rejected by the Supreme 
Court in KSR v. Teleflex.77 In KSR, the Court ruled that obviousness 
determinations should be flexible. The court noted that inventors are not 
automatons, and possess ordinary creativity.78 Further, references might be 
combined for many reasons, including market factors and limited choices 
available to solve a known problem.79   
After KSR, the bright-line, strait-jacket test of design patent obviousness 
must be rejected.80 Current rules are neither supported by statute nor 
Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, design patents should be (and used to be) 
judged like any other patent.81 Surprisingly, the rigid rule is still used.82 
                                                 
75 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
76 In Apple v. Samsung, the lineage of the two-step rule is traced to Durling v. 
Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed.Cir.1996). The rule is much older, 
though. In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 391 (CCPA 1982); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn 
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[Defendant] offered twenty-two 
references that were asserted to show or suggest various features of the ‘081 design, and 
argues that the ‘081 design is readily reconstructed from elements found in the prior art. . . 
.The district court concluded that there was no teaching or suggestion in the prior art of the 
appearance of the claimed design as a visual whole. We discern no error. . . .”) 
77 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
78 550 U.S. at 421. 
79 550 U.S. at 424. 
80 550 U.S. at 421 (“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common 
sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.”). 
81 Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 695 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(“What plaintiff did amounted to nothing more than an unstartling regrouping of old 
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Practically, it may be difficult for patent examiners to find displays to 
use as prior art. Such displays are not part of any database. This concern 
only goes so far, however. As discussed above, design patents cite on 
average more than twenty prior art references, which are both prior design 
patents and products disclosed by inventors. Despite these references, there 
are almost never rejections based on references the examiner thought 
relevant enough to cite. Not requiring inventors to explain—even once—
why their designs rise above the prior art diminishes the entire process. 
 
3. Limitation: Infringement and Filtration  
Better rules that eliminate obvious patents before they issue would be 
preferable to leaving all decision-making until litigation. Even so, if 
disputes do arise, more critical consideration of infringement standards can 
alleviate many GUI design patent concerns. The conventional wisdom 
among lawyers I have met is that design patent protection is extremely 
narrow, requiring nearly identical features.83 They are surprised when they 
                                                                                                                            
elements which demonstrated no originality born of inventive faculty. This is not 
enough.”); but see Jason J. Du Mont, A Non-Obvious Design: Reexamining the Origins of 
the Design Patent Standard, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 531, 599-604 (2010) (arguing that 
design patents were never intended to be judged by an obviousness standard, and that 
permissive obviousness rules are a product of standard that had become too harsh). Perhaps 
courts have overcorrected, because the standard is virtually non-existent now. 
82 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(applying rigid rule without citing to KSR but citing pre-KSR obviousness rules: “To 
determine whether ‘one of ordinary skill would have combined teachings of the prior art to 
create the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design,’ the finder of fact must 
employ a two-step process. First, ‘one must find a single reference, 'a something in 
existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed design.' 
Second, ‘other references may be used to modify [the primary reference] to create a design 
that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.’ However, the 
‘secondary references may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are 'so 
related to the primary reference that the appearance of certain ornamental features in one 
would suggest the application of those features to the other.’”) (citations omitted) ; but see, 
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(affirming under old rules, but leaving open possibility that KSR might apply: “it is not 
obvious that the Supreme Court necessarily intended to exclude design patents from the 
reach of KSR.”).  Apple v. Samsung cited Titan Tire but made no mention of avoiding rigid 
rules. 
83 See, e.g., Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *60 (“We anticipate 
that design patents on virtual designs are likely to be used primarily as tools to combat 
counterfeiting. We are referring to cases in which the accused design is identical to the 
patented design. . . .”); Bruce A. Kugler & Craig W. Mueller, A Fresh Perspective on 
Design Patents, 38 COLO. LAW. 71, 72 (2009) (describing point of novelty test as allowing 
easy infringement avoidance). This is not a new understanding. Consider, for example, 
Arthur W. Cowles, Mechanical and Design Patents, 3 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 484, 488 (1921) 
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learn that merely similar designs might infringe, and even more surprised to 
learn that those similarities might be the abstracted ideas of the design 
rather than similarities in the actual images. Even if the Apple v. Samsung 
case may be the first of its kind, it represents a potential precedent for 
design patent GUI litigation.  
Beginning with the next subsection, the remainder of this Article is 
dedicated to this topic, which is also the third question from the 
introduction. 
 
C.  Infringement and Filtration 
The design patent rule for infringement is similar to that in copyright 
law: similarity. With design patents, infringement determinations are made 
by comparing the accused device with the design patent, to see whether the 
ordinary observer familiar with all of the designs in that field would believe 
that the accused product is the same as the claimed design.84 Stated this 
way, the rule is even easier to satisfy than copyright infringement; one need 
only be confused about which design is being used.  
The infringement rule does not allow for focus on just those elements 
that are new, the so-called “point of novelty” of the design.85 Furthermore, 
the designs need not be exact; they need only be similar enough that the 
ordinary observer would find similarity.86 
One potential divergence from copyright law is the absence of filtration 
in the infringement analysis. A primary mechanism used to allow reuse in 
copyright law is filtration.87 Before any copyrighted GUI is compared to an 
accused GUI, unprotected elements like ideas are filtered out. Only the 
                                                                                                                            
(“A mechanical patent is superior to a design patent for the external configuration of the 
mechanical instrument, because theoretically the properties of the mechanical instrument 
may be embodied in more than one external configuration, therefore, in more than one 
design.”). 
84 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871) (“[I]f, in the eye of an 
ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are 
substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing 
him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the 
other.”); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
85 Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 672-73. 
86 Id. 
87 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (introducting 
abstraction and filtration); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 
1992) (“As discussed herein, we think that HN14 district courts would be well-advised to 
undertake a three-step procedure, based on the abstractions test utilized by the district 
court, in order to determine whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer 
programs are substantially similar.”) 
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swiss-cheese creative expression that survives filtration may be asserted 
against others. 
In theory, the design patent rule might still allow for filtration. For 
example, elements associated with the prior art might be filtered somewhat. 
After all, the ordinary observer is expected to know the prior art, and to not 
find infringement where the similarities are based on preexisting designs.88  
Indeed, some courts have also filtered out functionality elements when 
testing for design patent infringement.89 Such filtration would expressly 
protect ornamental elements, but not functional ones. 
In reality, however, filtration is much more difficult to achieve under 
current practices. Because all prior art is submitted to the jury, any filtration 
is invisible to the courtroom and thus nearly invulnerable to appeal.90 
Furthermore, while judges are willing to filter out functional elements in 
bench trials, they are less willing to do so for jury trials, again leaving such 
determinations unreviewable.91 
As discussed below, judges should retake this gatekeeping role and filter 
in every case. 
 
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The economic analysis92 begins with the revelation that it is too costly – 
perhaps impossible – to devise a consistent rule regulating reuse of 
computer software elements that can be consistently applied ex ante.93 This 
revelation is reflected in the contrary judicial opinions and scholarly 
proposals of the time. The discussion here attempts to use this information 
to explain judicial behavior. 
 
A.  Genesis of Reuse 
The late 1980’s and early 1990’s were a time of great uncertainty in 
                                                 
88 Egyptian Goddess, 543, F.3d at 672. 
89 Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (court 
filtered out functional elements in bench trial). 
90 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13240, *13 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 29, 2013) (adopting deferential standard to jury verdict and assuming jury weighed all 
prior art.) 
91 Id. at *16 (“The cases do not suggest that this type of claim construction is 
appropriate when instructing a jury.”) 
92 This section includes some of the key relevant analysis from the prior paper. A 
complete presentation of the model and its defense is offered there. 
93 Risch, supra note 2; see, e.g., William F. Patry, Copyright and Computer Programs: 
It’s All in the Definition, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (1996) (arguing that courts 
have “overreacted” and propounded inconsistent definitions of “originality” and “computer 
program” thus making consistent and efficient decision making difficult). 
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copyright law with respect to the reuse of computer software elements. 
Three leading cases ruled in apparently contradictory ways.  
In Whelan v. Jaslow,94 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a 
copyright infringement verdict. In Whelan, the defendant had worked on a 
dental office program with the plaintiff and had entered into a joint sales 
agreement.95 He then created a competing program that bore some 
similarity to the plaintiff’s program—at least in functionality for dental 
offices.96 The court held that the look and feel was sufficient to constitute 
infringement, even though the similarities were based in part on the needs 
of a dental office.97 Whelan is now nearly universally derided as 
overprotecting software.98 
In Lotus v. Borland,99 the First Circuit seemed to go the opposite 
direction, ruling that a menu user interface could never be protected because 
such menus are “modes of operation” unprotected by the Copyright Act.100 
The court likened the menus to buttons on the VCR (or now, a DVD 
player).101 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the opinion was 
affirmed by an evenly divided vote due to a recusal.102 About 15 amici 
briefs were filed in the case, with only one of them favoring Lotus. 
Finally, cases like Computer Associates v. Altai103 presented a 
reasonable legal rule, but provided too little guidance to aid lower courts in 
making decisions. The Computer Associates court mandated use of the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test. Using this test, the court determines 
the various levels of abstraction in the program—from the very specific 
expression to the most general ideas presented—and removes 
uncopyrightable elements. For example, ideas are not protected nor are 
scenes a faire, the common elements one would expect to see associated 
                                                 
94 Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
95 797 F.2d, at 1226. 
96 Id. at 1227 (“Dentcom [Jaslow] sold both the Dentalab and Dentcom programs, and 
advertised the Dentcom program as ‘a new version of the Dentalab computer system.’). 
97 Id. at 1248 (“We hold that (1) copyright protection of computer programs may 
extend beyond the programs' literal code to their structure, sequence, and organization, and 
(2) the district court's finding of substantial similarity between the Dentalab and Dentcom 
programs was not clearly erroneous.”). 
98 See, e.g, Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 
1256, 1262 (5th Cir.1987) (expressly rejecting portions of Whelan v. Jaslow). 
99 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995) 
100 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
101 49 F.3d at 817. 
102 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) 
103 Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Gates 
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 1993); Apple Computer v. 
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1445-46 (9th Cir.1994). 
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with a particular type of computer program.104 
While the rule is helpful in theory, it provides too little guidance in 
practice. It does not help courts decide what to abstract or what to filter. 
Consider, for example, the competing desktop motifs in Apple v. 
Microsoft.105 The court ruled that the use of a desktop motif in general was 
an unprotectable idea, but that a particular creative way of organizing a 
computer screen to look like a desktop was expressive creativity.106 It is not 
clear why a desktop should have been considered an idea, though, because 
desktop organization of computers was not standard at the time Apple 
implemented it, and it had little relation to computer operation at that time.  
In fact, the court did rule that HP could not use Apple’s particular 
depiction of the trash can,107 which may be why Microsoft uses the recycle 
bin today. But the trash can could have been a separate level of abstraction; 
once one accepts a desktop motif, it is not unreasonable to include a trash 
can. And once inclusion of a trash can is considered an unprotected idea, 
one would expect that trash cans will look similar.108 
These examples show how difficult it is for courts to define and apply 
ex ante rules. The cases appear to either overprotect or underprotect 
copyrighted expression. Where the cases apply a standard, the standard 
provides weak guidance. 
 
B.  Descriptive and Normative Application 
Given the apparent inability to prescribe consistent rules or easily 
applied standards, courts are left to apply the law as well as they can. The 
question is how they do so. The analysis presented here, seeks to explain 
                                                 
104 Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“[G]olf is not a game subject to totally "fanciful presentation." In presenting a realistic 
video golf game, one would, by definition, need golf courses, clubs, a selection menu, a 
golfer, a wind meter, etc. Sand traps and water hazards are a fact of life for golfers, real and 
virtual.”). 
105 35 F.3d at 1443. 
106 Id. (“Apple cannot get patent-like protection for the idea of a graphical user 
interface, or the idea of a desktop metaphor which concededly came from Xerox. It can, 
and did, put those ideas together creatively with animation, overlapping windows, and 
well-designed icons; but it licensed the visual displays which resulted.”). 
107 Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (“Like 
the garbage icons in the Macintosh and Lisa, the ‘Waste Basket’ icon in [HP’s] NewWave 
Developer's Release is depicted as an outdoor alley-style cylindrical garbage can with a lid 
and a handle on the top. Although the [HP] garbage can … does not have vertical lines to 
indicate a fluted surface or a handle, a trier of fact could reasonably find substantial 
similarity between it and the garbage icons in Apple's works.”). 
108 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(holding that similarities in jewelry shaped like bees were due to bee similarities, and not 
infringing). 
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how the courts have (and continue to) resolve difficult computer software 
reuse questions. 
As such, the analysis is primarily descriptive – it identifies the factors 
that courts apply, even if those factors are not technically part of the rules or 
standards. Instead, once these factors are present, courts will apply the rules 
and standards available to achieve the right outcome. 
Despite the admittedly backward looking nature, I believe that the 
factors identified here are predictive of how courts will behave in the future. 
I also believe that they are normatively justified, and should be applied even 
if I am wrong as a descriptive matter.  
The obvious objection here is that it is easy to explain an economic 
theory in hindsight to fit the facts of the cases, and that does not mean it is 
normatively justified. This analysis, like others, is open to that criticism. 
But this analysis is different in one key respect. Rather than starting by 
explaining the past, it considers the future. In other words, as discussed 
below, courts are concerned with the past and the future. The analysis is 
based on normative suppositions. While one may argue that such 
suppositions are wrong, one cannot argue that they are based solely on a 
descriptive aggregation of the cases. Instead, the cases fit the social welfare 
we would expect to see given different decisions. For this reason, the 
analysis shows that Whelan, a case that is universally reviled as wrong, was 
normatively justified based on the theory. 
Thus, the analysis is descriptive of past activities, but is also supported 
by sufficient welfare maximization theory and sufficient predictive power to 
serve as a normative basis for the future. 
 
C.  Intermediate (or Delayed Ex Ante) Optimization and Dynamic 
Efficiency 
The analysis diverges from some traditional assumptions, however. It 
assumes that courts maximize social welfare based on the facts before them, 
in a sort of delayed ex ante analysis. Thus courts will consider the 
relationship of the parties, the importance of the software, the number of 
users affected, and other such information to ensure society is better off.  
This may not appear unusual, but it is. Traditional analysis implies that 
courts attempt to set rules to maximize social benefit from an ex ante 
perspective, without regard to the specific dispute at hand. Under a pure ex 
ante model, courts should subject themselves to a veil of ignorance, 
choosing the law that will lead to the best outcomes before either has 
written any software code at all. Some call this dynamic efficiency: 
consideration of efficiency at many points in time, rather than ex post. 
The analysis here is not quite ex post, though, and attempts to maintain 
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dynamic efficiency considerations. An ex post analysis would begin the 
analysis at the time of the lawsuit, at a time when all information was 
revealed and no information could change future behavior. Instead, here the 
intermediate time period is measured just before the reuser makes the 
decision to reuse. In other words, the court considers what came before the 
reuse, but still sets rules that might affect the behavior of the reuser given 
how the world has treated the original work. Thus, the analysis is 
interchangeably considered intermediate or delayed ex ante.109  
The difference between the ex ante and intermediate approach is 
exemplified by Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,110 in which the court denied 
copyright protection to a plate depicting scenes from the Wizard of Oz. 
Judge Posner ruled that because administrative costs are high in 
determining whether a second plate copied from the original plate or from 
the movie, the original plate should be denied protection.111 Using 
intermediate analysis, however, a court would recognize that in this case, 
the defendant knew that Gracen made the plate, and deliberately copied the 
original plate without paying her;112 there were no administrative costs at all 
at the time Bradford Exchange decided to reuse the work. Social welfare – 
of a different kind – would be maximized, based on the facts before the 
court before the decision to reuse.  
Posner’s outcome was arguably efficient ex ante because the author 
would in general get paid for her work and would have an incentive to 
create, even if copyright did not inhere. Further, a small incentive is all that 
would be necessary because of the small degree of creativity required.  In 
addition, the administrative cost of determining the original elements for 
copyright protection in derivative works based on live people, photographs, 
or motion pictures would be high in most cases. 
Under intermediate analysis, however, the judge would note that in this 
case the author did not get paid for her work, and therefore it would 
improve the welfare to require payment for the reuse; otherwise, people 
might stop creating new designs that might simply be copied without 
reward.  Also, the administrative costs described above did not even exist in 
the case at bar, as copying was virtually admitted.  Finding infringement 
would have been dynamically efficient because it would have created future 
incentives to not breach economic relationships with little offsetting 
administrative or other social costs. 
Gracen is an extreme example of ex ante analysis making a rule that is 
                                                 
109 My prior article used the term “ex post” as a term of art, but I opt for the more 
accurate terminology here. 
110 698 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1983). 
111 Id. at 304-05. 
112 Id. at 301-02. 
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ostensibly efficient for all cases in the future, on average, without regard to 
the current case.113 Delayed ex ante consideration will often lead to 
conclusions similar to the pure ex ante analysis, but a focus on the facts at 
the time of reuse may also allow a focus on “unexpected” behavior that 
might occur after the first work is created.  
In short, the analysis focuses on facts that are unknown before creation 
of the first work, but are important and known at the time reuse occurs. As 
discussed further below, what happens after the first product is released is 
critical to the analysis. 
A key question is why the generalizations do not simply lead to new ex 
ante rules that affect incentives to create. To some extent, they do. Knowing 
each of the factors will guide initial decisions about both how much to 
create and how much to reuse. The reuse allowed by the analysis will 
certainly affect the costs and benefits of protection at the time the first  
work is created, and will continue to affect decisions for the creation of 
followon works.  
The factors cannot solely consider ex ante facts, though, because we 
also value reuse. And we cannot know the nature of any reuse until the 
reuser actually makes the decision to reuse, sometimes long after the first 
program is created. The decision of what to reuse and how will be based on 
technical and market considerations that do not develop until long after the 
first program is sold. Thus, exploring all of the costs and benefits associated 
with the factors remains impossible until the time just prior to reuse.  
Because there are two actors, the courts’ decisions must consider both ex 
ante incentives to create and ex post incentives to reuse in order to 
maximize social benefits. After all, every software creator is also a partial 
reuser of what came before. Despite incorporating additional factual 
information, dynamic efficiency considerations are maintained. 
 
D.  The Factors 
Though judicial decision-making can be modeled in a cost and benefit 
formula,114 courts don’t explicitly apply calculations. Indeed, the rules that 
courts can apply are limited, and may not explicitly consider the social 
welfare calculus. But the combination of rules available give courts tools to 
reach appropriate outcomes, even if they are not doing so explicitly. 
                                                 
113 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has all but repudiated Gracen since Computer Software 
Reuse was published. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 
2009) (“[Gracen] should not be understood to require a heightened standard of originality 
for copyright in a derivative work.”). 
114 Computer Software Reuse presents the full model, including a more complex 
mathematical description in the footnotes. Risch, supra note 2, at 524 n. 62. 
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Furthermore, while each case is different, trends do emerge. The goal of 
this section is to identify and discuss several economic factors that might 
affect judicial analysis. These factors make some assumptions about costs 
and benefits associated with each factor. Of course, courts faced with actual 
disputes might change their analyses where the factors do not cleanly apply. 
Courts should and do consider at least four factors when deciding 
whether software should be reused. First, they consider market substitution. 
Second, they consider customer need for compatibility. Third, they consider 
competitive need for compatibility. Fourth, they consider the breach of an 
economic relationship. 
In each of these factors societal benefits are either increased or 
decreased, and the costs and benefits to the parties are roughly equal 
because there is a wealth transfer.  This is a good thing. Because each case 
affects societal benefits, it is that much more important to be able to 
distinguish cases (or fact patterns within a case) where societal benefits 
increase and where societal benefits decrease.  The factor based analysis 
becomes even more important when multiple factors appear in the same 
case, as factors might offset each other. 
 
1. Market Substitution 
Where the reuse is intended to substituted directly for the original in the 
marketplace, courts will be less likely to allow the reuse; the closer to 1:1 
the substitution is, the more likely reuse will be barred. 
Here, the first producer will be worse off due to profits taken by the 
reuser. On the other hand, the reuser will be better off having taken some of 
the market. Indeed, the reuser may gain even more than the original 
producer loses depending on how much value the new product adds in the 
market.  
In other words, at worst, there is a direct wealth transfer from the 
producer to the reuser. There is some benefit to the reuser that exceeds the 
loss to the producer. This is because the reuser adds value, which enhances 
benefits. Further, as the reuser adds more value, the loss to the producer is 
less due to reuse and more to competition.  In short, the more new value 
added by the reuser, the more increased private benefits there will be (and 
the more likely reuse will be allowed).115 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Sony Comp. Ent. Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“The district court found that ‘[t]o the extent that such a substitution [of Connectix's 
Virtual Game Station for Sony PlayStation console] occurs, Sony will lose console sales 
and profits.’ [] We recognize that this may be so. But because the Virtual Game Station is 
transformative, and does not merely supplant the PlayStation console, the Virtual Game 
Station is a legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and Sony-
licensed games can be played.”). 
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Societal benefits are ambiguous depending on the amount of 
substitution.  Dynamic efficiency implies that some benefits will decrease 
due to decreased incentive to create caused by decreased profits if reuse is 
generally allowed. However, an offsetting societal gain may be due to 
increased competition and the innovation that follows new creation.  The 
more the substitution, the more incentives decrease and the smaller the 
benefit from competition. 
 On the whole, to the extent that societal and producer benefits 
decrease more than benefits increase for the reuser, the court will disallow 
reuse. For this reason, courts are far more likely to bar slavish copying, and 
more likely to allow reuse that adds new value or does not constitute a 
direct substitution. 
 
2. Customer Need for Compatibility 
Courts allow reuse if many customers would benefit from the reuse or 
be harmed by its disallowance. This factor is driven by intermediate 
analysis, because customer needs cannot be known at the time the original 
work is created.116  In short, market success leads to customer reliance, and 
limited reuse of key elements may improve social welfare. Thus, the 
functionality associated with this factor will relate primarily to ergonomics 
and operations. 
Considering customer needs does not sacrifice dynamic efficiency. As 
long as slavish copying of an entire program is disallowed, this factor still 
ensures that companies recoup their investment in the first software 
program. They will, of course, make investment decisions that consider the 
probability that some program elements will lose protection due to customer 
needs. Thus, the investment in each program may decrease, but the ability 
for new program authors to compete and add new features by reusing 
certain elements offsets this decrease. A court should only reduce the 
protection if customer/societal interests would actually be served by 
reducing protection. 
One area where this factor will arise is with de facto standards. A 
product becomes a “de facto” standard when virtually everyone uses it 
regardles of approval by some governing body.117 Such standards are 
                                                 
116 Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property 
Protection of Software, 24 J. Legal Stud. 321, 351 (1995). 
117 Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through Capture of Industry Standards, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 633 (2002) (“De facto standards are not promulgated by a 
particular body, but arise spontaneously due to marketplace success.”); David A. Balto, 
Standard Setting in a Network Economy (Feb. 17, 2000) (“Although standard setting case 
law is almost exclusively devoted to the activities of standard setting associations, 
competition principles apply equally to situations in which a dominant firm sets a de facto 
14-Aug-13] Functionality of GUI Design Patents 29 
peculiar because market leads are transient. By the time a dispute is 
adjudicated, the market lead may be gone while the standard remains.118  
The question is whether there exists a trademark-like “policing” duty 
that the first creator must perform to keep a program element from 
becoming an industry standard, or whether a program element is so 
important that courts will allow reuse whether or not the element has been 
“policed.”119  
The “customer compatibility needs” factor allows courts to assess–at 
any time during the first product’s life cycle–when an element should cease 
to be protected and when it may be used by other programmers. At this 
point in time, the creator would no longer be able to rely on the product’s 
“momentum” and others would be able to use certain elements.120  It may 
be, like many generic trademarks, that early on in a product’s life, the 
element is protected but later on the element may be reused. 
As with substitution, producers will lose some benefits due to market 
substitution for the new product. Assuming no slavish copying, though, 
private gains to the reuser should be positive and outweigh the producer’s 
loss due to the reuser’s ability to break into a market that would otherwise 
be captured by the producer’s product.   
With respect to social welfare, there may be some reduction due to a 
lack of incentive to create.  The decrease attributable directly to the law 
should not be large, however, because the loss to producers caused solely 
by the reuse (rather than competition) is arguably relatively small if the 
original software is so popular that customers would benefit from reuse.121 
Because this factor includes switching costs, we would expect social 
costs to decrease (and welfare to rise) due to lower switching costs. Another 
aspect of social welfare might increase due to greater competition and 
incentive to innovate by reusers, in addition to more customers who are 
                                                                                                                            
standard and abuses its subsequent market power through exclusionary acts such as 
monopoly leveraging,” ), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.shtm. 
118Patry, supra, note 93, at 8 n37 (noting that by the time of the Lotus v. Borland 
decision relating to reuse of menu structure, Lotus was no longer the substantial market 
leader it had once been.). 
119 Of course, a further question is whether design patents change the calculus, as 
discussed below. 
120Timothy S. Teter, Note, Merger and Machines: An Analysis of the Pro-
Compatibility Trend in Computer Software Copyright Cases, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1072 
(1993);  Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMET. J. 35, 36 
(1989). 
121Lawrence D. Graham and Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment 
of Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS 
COMP. & TECH. L.J. 61, 125 (1996) (noting broad approval of reverse engineering when 
monopoly profits are large). 
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better able to choose programs that meet their needs.122 In addition, the 
potential for new competition might drive the initial provider to develop 
new software rather than simply rely on its prior work. 
Additionally, social costs might be affected by the standards aspects of 
any program. The costs may be high or low, depending on the quality of the 
pre-existing program.  If the program is of high quality, then the increase in 
social costs will be low by allowing reuse; allowing more people to use high 
quality software features is a social good. Indeed, barring reuse may 
actually create social costs.123 However, if the program quality is low, then 
the increase in social costs could be high; allowing reuse will not create 
incentives to create improved technology, and more customers will use 
inferior technology.124 While there is disagreement on this issue,125 partial 
reuse for customer compatibility indicates that the increase in social costs 
would be small, because new software manufacturers will be allowed only 
to reuse the elements necessary to keep customer costs low, but reusers 
would otherwise add functionality in order to obtain future customers. 
In the aggregate, the gain in social benefit and the decrease in social cost 
should outweigh the sometimes administratively costly determination of 
whether customer needs for compatibility justify limited protection for 
certain elements.126 On the whole, social benefits are increased greatly, 
switching costs are reduced (to varying degrees), other social costs may 
increase slightly, and benefits gained by the reuser outweigh a loss in 
benefits to the producer. Thus, in most cases where there is a customer need 
for compatibility, courts will allow reuse. 
 
3. Competitive Need for Compatibility 
The fourth factor assesses the competitive need for compatibility. This 
factor relates more to operation functionality reuse of ideas than to 
ergonomics. The factor is directly driven by the need for software programs 
to communicate with other programs, to work on a particular hardware 
                                                 
122Id. 
123Nicolas P. Terry, GUI Wars: The Windows Litigation and the Continuing Decline of 
Look and Feel, 47 ARK. L. REV. 93, 132 (1994). 
124Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMET. J. 35, 46 
(1989) (excessive dissemination means that an inferior standard may capture the market). 
125 Compare Farell, Id., with Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright 
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (1989) (broad 
copyright protection may lead companies to adopt incompatible and non-efficient standards 
to avoid reuse) and Matthew P. Larvick, Note, Questioning the Necessity of Copyright 
Protection for Software Interfaces, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 187, 211-12 (1994) (limited or no 
protection for user interfaces will not “freeze” current interfaces into static standards). 
126 Teter, supra note 120, at 1072. 
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platform, or to provide features expected of a particular type of device.  
The factor is similar to the trade dress notion of functionality: to the 
extent that software looks similar because of functional requirements, the 
reuser will not be held liable for copyright infringement.127 However, for 
copyright, this factor usually relates to unseen portions of programs. Its 
potential application to design patents will follow in a later section. 
Some argue that competitive compatibility is simply a pretext for 
cheaply taking profits rightly earned by the first author’s original 
creation.128  The pretext argument fails economic analysis, however.129  
Companies that must copy in order to compete under this factor will usually 
attempt to license the technology because it is less expensive and more 
expedient than reverse engineering and protracted legal battles.130  Because 
one company owns the technology another is trying to license, however, 
hold-up costs arise, which make voluntary and efficient transactions more 
difficult to achieve. The courts must resolve such market failures. 
As with the other factors, the reuser gains while the producer loses, and 
they roughly offset each other at least. Here, too, the gains to the reuser 
should exceed the loss to the producer based on increased competition and 
value added to the second program. Of course, the more elements of a 
program that are reused, the more equal redistribution of benefits becomes. 
Social welfare should increase due to increased competition and 
increased value to computer program users.131 The story is not complete, 
there, though. Society should expect some decreased incentives to create by 
the original developer. The decrease in social benefits is likely outweighed 
by the gained benefits of increased competition and added value in reuse, 
                                                 
127 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148-49 (1989) 
(holding that the patent system alone governs copying of ideas and functional elements); 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (affirming finding that 
color of medicine was functional). 
128Christopher Hager, Note, Apples & Oranges: Reverse Engineering as a Fair Use 
After Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER AND TECH. L. J. 
259, 320 (1994) (“[T]heir true objectives were to cash in on commercial markets 
established by the plaintiffs . . . .”). 
129David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis . . . At Least as 
Far as It Goes, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 1131, 1146 (1994) (“The Ninth Circuit concluded, 
however, that the public benefit resulting from a commercial use is a factor worthy of 
consideration even if the objective and consequences of the use is economic gain”).   
130Lauren Bruzzone, Note, Copyright and License Protection for Computer Programs: 
A Market Oriented Assessment, 11 PACE L. REV. 303, 314 (1991). Indeed, Google 
attempted to license Java from Sun, but the fee was so high (and time limited) that it was 
apparently cheaper to write a compatible version. James Niccolai, Google: Sun Offered to 
License Java for $100 million, NETWORK WORLD (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/072211-google-sun-offered-to-license.html. 
131Teter, supra note 120, at 1063-71. 
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but it is a consideration nonetheless.   
Like the customer needs factor, it is also possible that societal costs will 
increase greatly due to widespread dissemination of an inferior standard.132 
On the other hand, however, if the court examines which elements are truly 
necessary to compete and allows reuse of only those elements, then it is 
likely that technology will advance due to new elements added by the 
reuser.  Because the primary benefit of this factor is market entry, it is 
reasonable to expect that new competitors that do not slavishly copy will 
add new program elements in order to actually make a profit. 
 
4. Breach of an Economic Relationship 
If the reuser breaches an economic relationship with the original 
software creator, then courts will be less likely to allow the reuse. This 
economic relationship might be a contract or an employment relationship. 
Here, the original would see costs associated with the economic breach. 
In copyright, these costs could be quite large if source code is involved. 
This loss is transferred to the reuser, who sees a benefit that might even 
exceed the loss to the producer. If the reuser gained less than the producer 
lost, then ordinary contract remedies, if available, might be sufficient to 
deter breach. Furthermore, where there is a prior economic relationship—
that is, where the reuser knew about the prior work and breached an 
obligation by reusing it—one would expect that the reuser would only do so 
if it expected large gains. 
Breaching economic relationships reduces social welfare because it 
reduces incentive to contract or create where obligations may be breached. 
From a software reuse perspective this is the most important consideration 
of this factor. Many works are created based on promises, and if reuse is 
allow without payment, then fewer works might be created. This would be 
bad for society. 
This factor is the reason why Whelan v. Jaslow was normatively the 
right outcome, despite its critics. However, because of this factor’s limited 
application to design patents (except those involving prior economic 
relationships), it is included here primarily for completeness. 
 
IV. APPLYING THE ANALYSIS TO DESIGN PATENTS 
Though the economic analysis works quite well with copyrighted 
                                                 
132 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property's 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 923 (2010) (“If so, then the usual story gets reversed: 
We should grant protection when - indeed, because - its net effect is to discourage 
innovation in a disfavored industry.”). 
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software,133 the design patent is a different animal. Consideration of those 
differences is appropriate to determine whether economic principles from 
copyright should even apply. 
Assuming the analysis does apply, there are two primary ways that 
courts can act as gatekeepers to maximize social welfare relating to GUI 
design patents. The first is the determination of whether a design is 
ornamental or functional. The second is determining which infringement 
arguments are allowed by the court—filtration.  
Courts should embrace this gatekeeping role for design patents and 
consider social welfare. They should do so, even if implicitly; they are 
certainly not doing it now. 
I make no claim that these analogies hold true for all of design patent 
law, though they might. For graphical user interfaces, however, design 
protection is very similar to copyright protection with respect to 
functionality and infringement. This section addresses each facet in turn. 
 
A.  Design Patent and Copyright Differences 
1. Functional Differences 
Unlike copyrights, design patents are examined by the PTO prior to 
issuance, and theoretically claim only novel and non-obvious design 
elements. This is a critical difference: it would be better to address concerns 
during examination if possible rather than wait until an infringement action. 
To be sure, there is an in terrorem effect associated with the mere existence 
of design patents, but the economic analysis here assumes that ship has 
sailed. Part II discusses the importance of allowing fewer patents, but this 
part assumes that the Court takes the dispute as it finds it. Even so, all is not 
lost; after all, the volume of copyright GUI cases decreased significantly as 
legal principles settled and judicial treatment of interfaces became expected. 
There is no reason to believe that the design patents would be any different. 
Aside from examination, there are important differences associated in 
copyright and patent protection. For example, design patents do not allow 
for independent development. Copyright law allows for independently 
developed versions of even identical designs. 
Further, copyrights typically cover entire computer programs. This 
might include the entire user interface, the entire source code, and other 
program elements. Design patents only claim discrete elements of the GUI. 
However, copyright lawsuits rarely relate to the entire user interface; every 
important case involved the arrangement of a few elements, the so-called 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 3. Though hardly a provable assertion, I recall telling 
colleagues that Napster would never be considered a fair use based on the factors. 
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“look and feel.” 
Finally, there is little room for a court to modulate the level of 
protection that a design patent offers. Unlike copyright, which offers 
numerous ways a court might reduce protection, a design patent is either 
valid or invalid, and it is either infringed or non-infringed.   
 
2. Conceptual Differences 
More conceptually, copyright and patent should be protecting two 
different things. Despite pretextual protection of “expression,” copyright 
has historically been used to protect functionality. The key cases discussed 
above, Lotus v. Borland, Whelan v. Jaslow, and Computer Associates v. 
Altai, were all about protection of the operable aspects of the program, not 
the static graphical screens. In each case, the structure, sequence, and 
organization of the user interface was combined with the remainder of the 
program to create a functional whole. 
As such, the abstraction, filtration, and comparison efforts were an 
attempt to determine which functions (and how they were triggered on the 
screen) could be owned by the original maker and which could be reused. 
Design patents, on the other hand, are supposed to protect only the 
design of the software. Even if there were to be some filtration, the 
comparison should be to copyright’s “useful article” doctrine, which limits 
copyright protection of useful graphical works only to the non-functional 
aspects. The problem is that the test for separating functionality from 
expression in copyright is a mess generally,134 and was basically abandoned 
in computer software. 
Consider, for example, this short quote from Lotus Dev. Corp. v. 
Borland Int'l:135  
  
Whatever expression there may be in the arrangement of the parts of 
a VCR is not capable of existing separately from the VCR itself, so 
an ordinary VCR would not be copyrightable. Computer programs, 
unlike VCRs, are copyrightable as “literary works.” Accordingly, 
one might argue, the “buttons” used to operate a computer program 
are not like the buttons used to operate a VCR, for they are not 
subject to a useful-article exception. The response, of course, is that 
the arrangement of buttons on a VCR would not be copyrightable 
even without a useful-article exception, because the buttons are an 
uncopyrightable “method of operation.”136   
                                                 
134 See, McKenna & Sandburg, supra note 47. 
135 49 F.3d 807 (1995). 
136 Id. at 817 (citation omitted). 
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This short segment a) improperly applied the useful article doctrine with 
respect to the VCR (the buttons are surely separable from the VCR); b) 
incorrectly implied that the doctrine would not apply to software (but GUIs 
are graphical works); and c) then abandoned the doctrine for method of 
operation analysis. 
This does not bode well for a similar “separability” analysis for GUI 
design patents. 
 
3. Reconciling the Differences 
The question remains, then, whether design patent rules are best 
informed by economic analysis that might otherwise apply to copyright.  
The answer to that question is yes. There may be differences, but those 
differences are at the doctrinal, not welfare maximization level. Even the 
conceptual differences discussed above are really about which doctrine to 
apply. But there is no law that says the doctrines used to maximize welfare 
for design patents must match the doctrines used to maximize welfare for 
copyrights. An important feature of the analysis is that courts do not know 
that they are using it; instead, they instinctually use whatever tools they 
have to maximize welfare. So, if conceptual separability is a failure for 
copyright, and design patents allows for some form of filtration, then courts 
should choose filter rather than separate. 
The economic analogies hold true even if one disbelieves the normative 
assumptions of the economic considerations presented here. For example, if 
one believes that more protection would better incentivize creation, the 
same would be true of both copyright and design patent. If one believed that 
less protection would better serve the public interest, the same would still be 
true of both. The courts should apply the tools available to reach the best 
level; I think my factors are sufficient, but others may supplement or 
replace the factors as they see fit. 
Even though design patents are different from copyright in many ways, 
the economic factors affecting graphical user interface design patent 
protection are very similar to the factors affecting copyright protection 
when it comes to functionality and infringement.137 Such patents are about 
surface ornamentation, after all. Functionality in design patent law is 
analogous to the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law. Abstraction 
and filtration in design patent law could be analogous to abstraction and 
filtration in copyright law. 
                                                 
137  Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 255, 296-98 (1997) (discussing how patent protection can lead to market in reusable 
software components). 
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B.  Ornamentality/Functionality 
As discussed above, design patents are intended for ornamental product 
designs that are not functional. If a design is solely functional, then it must 
be protected, if at all, by a utility patent. However, courts rarely make 
distinctions about different types of functionality, and they have long held 
that where functionality and ornamentality mix, a design patent may issue 
so long as the design is not dictated by functionality.138 The number of 
cases invalidating patents is far outweighed by the number of cases 
allowing them.139 
The law currently includes few limitations on patenting. Federal Circuit 
precedent allows design patents that incorporate functional elements, unless 
the design embodies the function or unless the function is necessary to 
compete in the market.140 But design patents do not have a “market,” 
making the test difficult. Designs that might be functional in one context, 
say a key blade designed to fit a type of lock,141 becomes completely 
ornamental when hung as a necklace pendant or used as a (dangerous) 
toy.142 Determinations of functionality in a market must depend, at least in 
part, on how the product will be used.143 Patentees can almost always point 
                                                 
138 In re Koehring, 37 F.2d 421, 424 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (holding that utilitarian objects 
may be protected with design patents, so long as someone cares about their ornamentation); 
Robert W. Brown & Co. v. De Bell, 243 F.2d 200, 202-203 (9th Cir. 1957) (“While it is the 
design which is patented, it is immaterial that the subject of the design may embody a 
functional or utilitarian purpose.”); In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 1964); 
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Hupp v. 
Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (design of concrete stamp 
ornamental, even though its sole function is to stamp concrete of the same shape). 
139 See also Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *46 (finding one 
rejection for functionality among all GUI patents since 1996). 
140 Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (design 
of key blade functional because no other shape would work in lock); Avia Group Int’l, Inc. 
v. L.A. Gear Cal., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn 
Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the particular design is essential to the 
use of the article, it can not be the subject of a design patent.”). 
141 Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566. 
142 See, e.g., Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *60 (t-shirt can 
infringe GUI patent since patent covers only the image and is not limited to a display 
screen). Consider Irwin Mainway’s Bag o’ Glass and Chainsaw Teddy Bear, both of which 
have dual function/playtime uses. Consumer Probe, SATURDAY NIGHT LIVE (Dec. 11, 
1976), http://snltranscripts.jt.org/76/76jconsumerprobe.phtml and 
http://www.hulu.com/watch/115713. 
143 37 CFR § 1.153 requires that the title and claim each identify the article of 
manufacture. However, broad leeway is given to describe use of the article, so long as it is 
clear what the article is. MPEP § 1503.1 ¶ 15.05 (“An acceptable title would be ‘door for 
cabinets, houses, or the like,’ while the title ‘door or the like’ would be unacceptable. . . .”). 
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to some ornamental aspect that is unrelated to a particular use. 
Thus, the functionality rule may not strike the right balance that allows 
patenting on ornamentality but not functionality. After all, a court must first 
find that the design incorporates a functional element at all, and courts may 
disagree on what GUI elements are functional rather than ornamental.144 
Additionally, if design alternatives exist, courts will not find 
functionality,145 presumably even if all the alternatives are patented. This is 
a distinct departure from copyright, where few design alternatives will bar 
protection. Further, the defendant must prove functionality by clear and 
convincing evidence.146  
As a result, a combination of elements, each of which might serve some 
utilitarian purpose, can be protected as a group if the design in the entirety 
is primarily ornamental rather than functional.147 
But courts need not allow such patents. Intermediate analysis might 
strike a different balance. A design that is ornamental when conceived may 
become functional years later, as technology expands and changes. Indeed, 
some designs may be functional when originally conceived, and become 
ornamental as time passes; for example, images of floppy disks used to 
denote saving data are less functional today than they were in 1995. 
Two examples illustrate how an ex post approach to functionality might 
be illuminated by the economic factors.148 The first is D457,164,149 which 
                                                                                                                            
Thus, “Key Design for locks, necklaces, or toys” would be acceptable. 
144 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *34 (expressing surprise at the 
number of utility patents cited as prior art in design patents). 
145 Hupp, 122 F.3d at 1460-61; Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; Thom McAn, 988 F.2d at 
1123. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846-
LHK, at p. 4 (Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013) (ruling that jury need not have been 
instructed about functional elements, because alternate designs were available). 
146 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
Presumably, the examiner could reject functional designs using a lower evidentiary 
standard, but this virtually never happens. 
147 988 F.2d at 1123. See also, Lee v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 
(Fed.Cir.1988). But see, Barofsky v. Gen. Elec. Corp., 396 F.2d 340, 344 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(“[B]ecause the dominant features of the design [for a cabinet door], and therefore the 
design as a whole, are primarily functional, this is not a valid design patent.”). 
148 Most of the examples presented relate to Apple, Inc., design patents. This is not 
accidental; Apple has protected its user interfaces with design patents in a highly visible 
way though, notably, in 2012 it was granted half as many design patents as Microsoft and 
fewer than even RIM (Blackberry). James Juo, Design Patent Prosecution, DESIGN 
PATENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD, at 3 (Conference Proceedings, Apr. 5, 2013) 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/final_new_pp
tx_658586_1-full_size-op-1.pdf. See also Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 
41, at *26 (noting that Microsoft is responsible for most of the growth of GUI design 
patents). 
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shows an expanding application window. One image is reproduced below, 
but the patent claims the entire expansion150 of the window from nothing to 
a rectangular window.  
At the time this patent was filed, 2000, the idea of animated window 
expansion was known, but the particular animation associated with Apple’s 
design may have been more ornamental than functional. There is no 
functional requirement that window maximization be animated (though it 
might improve user experience),151 and there was certainly no functional 
requirement that windows be expanded in this particular way. 
However, as time passes, customers might come to expect this behavior. 
First, docking of minimized applications at the bottom of the screen is well 
accepted across operating systems.  Second, animated window expansion is 
commonly used. Third, there are only so many ways for a window to 
expand from a docked icon to a rectangle. Thus, what was once a nice 
design might now be a de facto standard.  
As such, a court’s willingness to protect the design might decrease as 
the standard becomes entrenched in user expectations. At least one case 
supports this view of functionality.152 Drawing on trademark law, the court 
ruled that design elements are functional if they are essential to the purpose 
of the article or affect its cost or quality.153 Using this standard, customer 
expectations, even of color, might be considered functional.154 
This implicates three of the factors. First, the substitution is not direct. 
The animation is not the entire program, but only a piece of it. It is unlikely 
that software companies will stop developing graphical user interfaces, nor 
even new expansion animations, if some reuse were allowed.  This factor 
may not favor reuse, but it does not necessarily weigh against reuse. 
Second, if this were a de facto standard, then the customer need for 
compatibility would favor reuse. Third, if there are only a few ways to 
expand a window, then the competitive need for compatibility might favor 
reuse. 
                                                                                                                            
149 Filed Jan. 5, 2000. 
150 Or minimization, if you are a glass half-empty kind of person. It is important to 
note that the design is not functional and could apply to either event, so long as they look 
the same. 
151 WILBERT O. GALITZ, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO USER INTERFACE DESIGN: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GUI DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 682 (3d ed. 2007) (“The 
changing of states of an element with two or more states will be easier to understand if the 
transitions are animated instead of being instantaneous.”). 
152 Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
153 Id. at 1371. 
154 Cf. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (affirming 
finding that color of medicine is functional). 
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Another example is Patent No. D670,713,155 claiming page turning 
animation. Here, the patent is newer, so the functionality implication is less 
reliant the passage of time. In this case, the functionality concern is two-
fold. First, the animation looks a lot like a book page turning. That is the 
point of the design, of course: simulating a book page turn on a display 
screen looks nice.  
 
 
However, if the design simulates reality then it is, in a sense, dictated by 
functional concerns – the way a book might look. Closely related to this is 
that there may be limited ways to simulate a book page turn, so that 
                                                 
155 Filed Dec. 19, 2011. 
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competitive needs for functionality might reign. The factors apply in much 
the same way in this case. 
Even if the entire design is not dictated by functionality under current 
law’s requirements to bar a design patent, there are two ways that courts 
might consider functionality in designs like the page turning book. The first 
is obviousness. If the design looks like something in the real world, then 
perhaps the design is obvious.156 Despite the good sense of this approach,157 
current law disfavors this type of obviousness consideration by the court as 
a gatekeeper. First, many district courts have divested themselves of any 
gatekeeping factual analysis in obviousness cases, leaving everything to the 
jury.158 Second, as discussed above, obviousness rules in design patents are 
extremely permissive, so courts and the PTO do not reject patents. 
However, more rigorous nonobviousness requirements applied to design 
patents might invalidate functional designs. 
A second way to handle functionality would be to allow such patents, 
but to filter out functional elements or otherwise limit infringement 
findings. This is consistent with Federal Circuit precedent: 
 
If the patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental, 
the patent is invalid. [] However, when the design also contains 
ornamental aspects, it is entitled to a design patent whose scope is 
limited to those aspects alone and does not extend to any functional 
elements of the claimed article.159 
 
For the page turn design, this would mean that a competing design 
would not infringe merely for implementing a page turning animation. 
Furthermore, only designs essentially identical to the patented design would 
infringe. This solution is only palatable if there are many ways to design 
                                                 
156 Du Mont & Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *54 (discussing anticipation of 
computerized daisy by a daisy drawn on flowerpot).  
157 See, e.g., Dann v. Johnson 425 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1976) (holding that known 
process implemented on a computer is obvious); In re Glavas. 230 F.2d 447, 450 (CCPA 
1956) (allowing use of surface ornamentation from any type of product to be considered for 
design patent obviousness). 
158 See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a 
Matter of Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846-
LHK, at p. 5 (Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013). The court allowed the jury to determine all 
facts associated with obviousness, but the jury received no special verdict questions about 
any of the factual questions from which the court could make a legal conclusion, such as 
the scope of the prior art, differences between the patent and the prior art, the level of skill 
in the art, or any secondary factors. Instead, the jury’s “patent is valid” verdict was 
assumed to implicitly include all facts necessary to find the patent non-obvious. The court 
then assumed that all the facts favored obviousness and ruled accordingly. 
159 Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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page turning animations. The next section considers infringement and 
filtration of functionality in more detail. 
 
C.  Infringement 
User interfaces are rarely identical. The test courts use to determine 
whether they are close enough to infringe is whether an ordinary observer 
who is familiar with the design and what came before it would think that the 
accused design is substantially the same.160 This test has always allowed 
some equivalents,161 but proving infringement is not always easy because 
the prior art must be considered.162 Indeed, infringement findings appear to 
be rarer than some might think.163 
Thus, where the accused GUI is not identical to the patented design, the 
court must determine the zone of potential infringement. This is a natural 
gatekeeper function that allows application of the factors. The allowable 
patent scope for purposes of equivalents might be varied by courts 
depending on the market substitution, the customer need for compatibility, 
and competitive need for compatibility. 
Consider, for example, Design Patent No. D604,305,164 owned by 
Apple, Inc., which is pictured in the introduction. The patent claims a 
screen for an electronic device with icons presented on it. The icons are 
square with rounded corners, and they are layered four across. The patent 
includes a “fixed” row of four icons at the bottom of the screen. In the 
actual device, we know that these icons—presumably those most favored by 
the user—remain the same, no matter what screen one looks at.  Of course, 
the patent does not require that the icons stay the same from screen to 
screen. It only requires the icons to be on a gray background at the bottom.  
Samsung developed a competing interface for its smartphones. Apple 
sued Samsung, and a jury found that Samsung’s “Touch Wiz” interface 
                                                 
160 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871); Egyptian Goddess, Inc. 
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
161 Geo. Borgfeldt & Co. v. Weiss, 265 F. 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1920) (holding that 
design patent claiming doll with cap might be infringed by doll with different head dress, 
including painted hair). Indeed, people often use the dinnerware at issue in Gorham as the 
prime example; there were many differences between the patent and the accused products. 
Perry Saidman, U.S. Design Patent Infringement, DESIGN PATENTS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD, at 6 (Conference Proceedings, Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/322028/media/slspublic/ENTIRE%20
Post%20EG%20040313-1.pdf. 
162 See, e.g., images of the patent, accused product, and prior art at issue in Egyptian 
Goddess, in which no infringement was found, despite apparent equivalence. Juo, supra 
note 148, at 8. 
163 Saidmain, supra note 161, at 24. 
164 Filed June 23, 2007. 
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infringed this design patent.165 
At the time of patent application filing, 2007, Apple’s design might 
have been ornamental and not dictated by functionality. After all, the look 
of the screen does not do anything when viewed. Furthermore, icons need 
not be rounded, and the icons at the bottom need not have a different color. 
At a time when few other devices had a touch-screen that would 
accommodate finger taps and gestures, the combination of elements on this 
screen may have been an “ornamental design for an article of 
manufacture.”166 
This was especially true because the first operable screen the user saw 
on the Apple iPhone looked much like the drawing in the design patent.167 
Thus, ex ante, the patent may be ornamental/nonfunctional. 
This view is charitable, in many respects. Pieces of the design must 
surely have been driven by functional considerations. The dock is especially 
troubling, because functionality might dictate a different color for a set of 
icons that does not change from screen to screen. Because the design patent 
does not claim any functional features, it presents as if the color is merely 
ornamental because the context of a working graphical user interface is 
missing. But any user of the iPhone, indeed any user of computer software, 
knows better. 
The idea of a fixed area using different coloring that held frequently 
used programs was not terribly new. Microsoft had used something similar 
since Windows95, and many “quick launch” program docks were available, 
and those docks were all a different color. RIM had introduced icons in 
rows on its Blackberry devices years before the iPhone was released,168 and 
Nokia had even provided an interface with square icons aligned in rows.169 
Of course, one had to scroll through the icons rather than touch them, but 
the arrangement only made scrolling easier. And scrolling should be 
irrelevant, because this is a design patent—only the appearance matters.  
Further, Adobe had used square icons with rounded corners for so long 
                                                 
165 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Jury Form, Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHK (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/ApplevSamsung-1930.pdf. 
166 35 U.S.C. § 171. 
167 There are other difficulties with calling this interface layout the “design” of an 
article. After all, the user controls both the number of icons on the screen and the images 
on those icons (by changing the applications on the screen).  
168 RIM BlackBerry 7230, PCMAG.COM (Oct. 1, 2003), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1265089,00.asp; Du Mont & Janis, Virtual 
Designs, supra note 41, at *21 (noting that RIM’s design patent for rows of icons is one of 
the most cited design patents). 
169 Nokia 6681 review: Extra style, GSM ARENA (May 8, 2005), 
http://www.gsmarena.com/nokia_6681-review-38p3.php. 
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that it abandoned them before Apple even applied for its patent.170 The 
federal government had even recommended square icons with rounded 
corners for icons in vehicle displays.171 
Even discounting the prior art and purely functional elements, many 
(many!) consumers grew to know and recognize how to use the Apple’s 
iPhone user interface as a whole, even if they did not own a device 
themselves. A few short years after introduction, such touch screens were 
ubiquitous. As smartphone sales grew, companies released competing 
operating systems. 
While square icons with rounded corners and a “dock” of four icons was 
not required, it was one of only a few functional ways to organize the 
limited space on a screen.172 It also allowed consumers to switch from the 
iPhone to Samsung’s Touch Wiz with minimal costs associated with 
learning of new layout concepts. 
Thus, courts should be more inclined to find Apple’s design functional 
now even if it was not entirely functional then. While Apple saw competing 
products as nothing more than pilfering of its design to steal customers,173 
the benefits of new entry of competing operating systems encouraged 
through low switching costs can maximize social benefit. Such designs 
would not always be functional ex ante, but the later reuse of a de facto 
standard presents new facts unavailable when the first design is created. 
To address the inevitable counter-argument, it is unlikely that earlier 
creators like Apple would cease to have an incentive to create new designs. 
To begin, Apple reused elements from the past. Further, Apple did not 
know which of its user interface elements would become so important that 
their protection might be limited. Even now, Apple continues to create new 
designs that will not become standards. It is also possible that the fame of 
                                                 
170 Prescott Perez-Fox, Out with the Old, PRESCOTT’S DESIGN BLOG (Dec. 17, 2006), 
http://www.perezfox.com/2006/12/17/out-with-the-old/. 
171 IN-VEHICLE DISPLAY ICONS AND OTHER INFORMATION ELEMENTS: VOLUME I, 
Publication No. FHWA-RD-03-065, at 4-4 Fig. 4-2 (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/03065/03065.pdf. 
172 Indeed, on larger devices like the iPad, the number of docked icons grows. This 
implies that the number of icons is determined almost exclusively by size, rather than 
aesthetics. Of course, choosing the right size and spacing may be an important aesthetic 
design decision; the question is whether one can exclude others from reusing those 
decisions on devices of nearly identical size and shape. 
173 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Volume 2 (Trial Transcript), Case No.: 11-CV-
01846-LHK (July 31, 2012) (“It meant that apple had invented something that was so 
unique and innovative that customers would no longer accept the devices that looked and 
acted -- that didn't have touch screens, for example. Faced with this reality . . . Samsung 
had two choices: . . . it could come up with its own designs [and] beat Apple fairly in the 
marketplace; or it could copy Apple.”), http://www.groklaw.net/pdf4/ApplevSamsung-
1547.pdf. 
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its design has caused it to stop creating improved interface elements despite 
the need for them.174 This is why new market entrants are so important. 
However, when considering Apple’s GUI design, it is difficult to argue 
that the entire design is functional. Only some of the basic ideas and other 
aspects are functional. For example, courts should not let a competitor reuse 
the exact icons, in the exact order, of those in the design. This differentiates 
the iPhone design from the unfolding window or the page turn animation. 
With the latter animations, the entire design might be considered functional, 
whereas with the whole GUI the entire design might be protectable, and 
reuse might be adjusted through infringement considerations. In this sense, 
the design protection is similar to “thin” copyright protection. It might be 
protected against direct copying, but not against reuse of the ideas that 
cause high-level similarities. 
And copying of high-level similarities is precisely what Apple argued at 
trial, and won. The Touch Wiz interface shown in the introduction is not an 
exact copy of the Apple design. In many ways, it is not even close. The 
icons are different. They are different colors. They are in a different order, 
and there are more of them. The background is a different color. The icons 
that were similar were driven by functional requirements, like the color 
green, the shape of a handset (which was not new to Apple), and a clock. 
Though it is technically irrelevant, the functions of the icons on the dock 
were different. Given these differences, Apple argued that the idea of the 
design was the same. One of the case exhibits is reproduced below; it makes 
Apple’s strategy clear. 
                                                 
174 Justin Fox, What Kind of Innovative Does Apple Have to Be?, HARVARD BUSINESS 
REVIEW BLOG NETWORK (June 11, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/fox/2013/06/what-kind-of-
innovative-does-apple-have-to-be.html. Consider, for example, the lack of widgets on 
Apple devices. 
14-Aug-13] Functionality of GUI Design Patents 45 
 
The strategy is plain. Samsung infringed because it used a) a grid, b) 
rounded rectangles, mixes of icon styles, colorful icons, and a bottom row 
with offsetting background. These are functions—ideas, ergonomics, 
operations. They are not the design themselves. To be sure, there is some 
similarity in the structure, sequence, and organization, but it is the structure 
and selection of different design elements. 
In other words, the only way for Samsung could infringe is that the 
doctrine of equivalents applied so broadly that merely using the same ideas 
infringed. This seems to violate the maxim—in use today even as applied to 
design patents—of “that which would infringe if after, anticipates if 
before.”175 Given the rigidity with which the obviousness test is applied, as 
discussed above, it is unclear whether any court would say that Samsung’s 
interface would render Apple’s patent non-novel if it predated it;176 Apple 
would surely claim that the functionality is similar, but the actual design 
                                                 
175 Int'l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“Moreover, it has been well established for over a century that the same test must be 
used for both infringement and anticipation.”). Compare Id. at 1239 (finding that Crocs 
patent does not anticipate plaintiff’s patent despite relatively small differences) with Crocs, 
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (finding infringement 
of Crocs patent despite relatively small differences from accused clogs). See also Du Mont 
& Janis, Virtual Designs, supra note 41, at *54 (discussing anticipation of computerized 
daisy by a daisy drawn on flowerpot because daisy on wallpaper, carpet, and shoes would 
infringe flowerpot patent). 
176 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
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differs from the Samsung in important ways, such as all of the icons having 
different images. And if the Apple patent would be allowed even if 
Samsung’s design were prior art, then Samsung should not be considered 
infringing. 
But the court allowed the infringement verdict to stand. Here, 
application of the principles discussed here would have allowed the court to 
reach a different result. While Apple, and perhaps the conventional wisdom, 
believe that Android “copied” the iPhone patent, this was not slavish 
copying. The market substitution was not 1:1, and Android added value. 
Furthermore, the aspects that were copied were the functional aspects. As 
noted above, this implicates the customer need factor, and even the 
competitive need factor. 
At the time that Samsung decided whether to implement Touch Wiz in 
the way it did, social welfare would have increased most by allowing this 
particular reuse. As a reminder, maximized wealth is societal wealth, not 
Apple’s wealth. The world is better off with two smartphones competing for 
customers by introducing more and better features, especially if users can 
easily switch between the two of them as they so desire. As one example, 
Apple’s unwillingness to implement a larger screen until 2012 despite 
tremendous popularity of larger Samsung screens implies that if Apple were 
the only product on the market, users would have missed out on product 
features that had nothing to do with the GUI design.  
Current law may not (and in fact, did not) allow the wealth maximizing 
outcome. There are, for example, other ways to design a user interface for 
small mobile devices, such as Microsoft’s Windows 8. Under current law, 
this implies that Apple’s design cannot be functional because it was not 
dictated by function. However, alternative interfaces have not done nearly 
as well in the market.177 
Another reason current law may not allow the wealth maximizing 
outcome is that courts are frenetic about whether and how to factor (the 
design patent term for filter) out functionality. The leading Federal Circuit 
decision, Egyptian Goddess,178 ruled that the infringement analysis must 
consider the design as a whole, and not merely focus on the novel 
aspects.179 But the case also noted that courts could instruct juries about 
                                                 
177 Alan Shimel, Windows Phone U.S. Market Share Growth Outpaces Android, 
NETWORK WORLD (Jun. 4, 2013) (despite growth, Windows 8 phones less than 6% of 
smartphone market), http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/windows-phone-us-
market-share-growth-outpaces-android. Apple would say that the reason is that its design is 
desired by more people, given that most of its business is going to either Apple or Android 
platforms that use a similar interface. 
178 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
179 543 F.3d at 672-73. 
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prior art and functional considerations.180 However, the court left matters up 
to the discretion of the jury.181 
This left later courts with little guidance. Some judges have factored out 
functionality, especially in bench trials.182 Other judges have refused to do 
so. For example, in Apple v. Samsung, Judge Koh ruled that filtering might 
be permissive in some cases, but was not appropriate for a jury.183  
In addition to the clear guidance in Egyptian Goddess and Richardson 
that filtering of functionality will be helpful to the fact finder (not just judge 
fact finders), as a matter of policy it seems odd that only in a bench trial can 
the proper analysis of functionality take place. Indeed, leaving filtering to 
the jury requires the appellate court to guess whether any filtering took 
place to determine whether there was substantial evidence of infringement. 
Worse, appellate courts cannot guess; they must assume that filtering took 
place, and assume that the jury properly compared only the ornamental 
features, even if the jury did not do so. 
Thus, without such filtering, patentees can seek ever widening 
infringement claims based on reuse of the ideas and functions in the patent, 
rather than reuse of the actual design. The great irony of Egyptian Goddess 
is that it disapproves of written claim constructions layered on the drawings 
themselves; the court makes clear that the drawings should speak for 
themselves if they can.184 This rule—when rigidly applied—leads to the 
very thing the case disapproves: infringement rulings based not on the 
drawings, but based on the ideas and functions in the drawings. 
In contrast, the economic analysis implies that the law must explicitly 
allow filtering if social welfare is a goal. The court must be a gatekeeper 
                                                 
180 Egyptian Goddess 543 F.3d at 680 (“[A] trial court can usefully guide the finder of 
fact by addressing a number of other issues that bear on the scope of the claim. Those 
include . . . distinguishing between those features of the claimed design that are ornamental 
and those that are purely functional. . . Providing an appropriate measure of guidance to a 
jury without crossing the line and unduly invading the jury’s fact-finding process is a task 
that trial courts are very much accustomed to . . . .”)(citations omitted). 
181 Id. 
182 See, e.g. Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (affirming district court focus on specific design 
aspects but filtering out functional configuration of massager); Richardson v. Stanley 
Works, Inc., 597 F. 3d 1288, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2010); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, 
Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed.Cir.1997) (filtering later approved in Egyptian Goddess and 
in Richardson); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 825 (Fed.Cir.1992). 
183 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Judgment as a Matter of 
Law, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co. Ltd., Case No. Case No.: 11-CV-01846-LHK, at 
pp. 3-4 (Document 2220, Jan. 29, 2013) (“Indeed, Egyptian Goddess warns of the risks of 
providing an element-by-element construction to a jury, as such instruction could divert the 
jury’s attention from ‘the design as a whole.’). 
184 Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en 
banc). 
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that filters out functionality in the infringement calculus. Furthermore, it 
may have been error for the Federal Circuit to have left such instructions to 
the discretion of district court judges. Functional filtering is a matter of 
claim construction—determining what the patentee owns and what it does 
not.185 As such, the construction should be performed by courts as a matter 
of law, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Markman.186 As with 
obviousness, there should be no exceptionalism for design patent claim 
scope determinations. 
Assuming that courts will perform filtering, Lee v. Dayton-Hudson187 
provides a clear, simple example. In that case, the design covered a 
particular design for a massager with a particular handle and rolling balls on 
the end.188 The accused device comprised a differently shaped handle with 
differently shaped rolling balls on the end.189 The Federal Circuit affirmed a 
finding of non-infringement, ruling that the designs themselves must match, 
not the ideas embodied by them: “While we agree [] that infringement can 
be found for designs that are not identical to the patented design, such 
designs must be equivalent in their ornamental, not functional, aspects.”190 
It should be noted, though, that filtering is not a panacea. Even if a court 
properly filters out functional elements, comparing the “entire” remaining 
ornamental design while ignoring functionality remains difficult to achieve 
in practice.191 It may be even more difficult to achieve with graphical user 
interfaces, where form and function are intertwined. 
Even so, the Lee case demonstrates that, as with copyright, courts have 
the ability—and some of the legal tools if they are willing to use them—to 
attempt to maximize social welfare. This is achievable right now, because 
                                                 
185 KeyStone Retaining Wall Sys., Inc. v. Westrock, Inc., 997 F.2d 1444, 1450 
(Fed.Cir.1993) (“A design patent protects the non-functional aspects of an ornamental 
design as seen as a whole and as shown in the patent.”); Amini Innovation Corp. v. 
Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
186 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (holding that court 
must construe patent claims.). 
187 838 F.2d 1186. 
188 Id. at 1187. 
189 Id. 
190 Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Applied Arts 
Corp. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corp., 67 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir.1933) (“To hold that 
general configuration made necessary by function must give to a patented design such 
breadth as to include everything of similar configuration, would be to subvert the purpose 
of the law, which is to promote the decorative arts. . . .”). 
191 Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc., 439 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (“The trial court is correct to factor out the functional aspects of various design 
elements, but that discounting of functional elements must not convert the overall 
infringement test to an element-by-element comparison. Thus, the trial court erred in its 
application of the “overall similarity” test on summary judgment.”). 
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the Federal Circuit allowed it in Egyptian Goddess and the Supreme Court 
has arguably mandated it; district courts should take up the mantle. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Whether knowingly or not, courts have considered the importance of 
graphical user interface elements and done their best to reach outcomes that 
incentivize future innovation while maximizing current benefits. This 
means that software designers cannot own everything, even if they patent a 
design. It also means that we might be willing to live with slightly less 
incentive to create the first program, if it spurs improvement in the second 
program. To understand this point, one need only compare the most popular 
software packages today to the most popular packages doing the same thing 
5, 10, or 20 years ago.  
Copyright law has long understood this, and economic analysis explains 
how courts behaved in practice. Design patent law seems to have missed the 
memo, despite the fact that the tools are potentially available to achieve the 
same goal. None of the legal tools discussed in the article are newly created. 
Instead, the tools have been left to languish, perhaps because—until now—
few design patents have been asserted to protect a large portion of an 
interface, rather than a single icon. 
Given that tools are available, courts should use them and act as 
gatekeepers in design patent cases. Like in copyright, they need not 
affirmatively attempt to maximize—or even consider—social welfare. 
Instead, their instincts, coupled with the available doctrine, should suffice. 
If courts are allowed to aggressively consider functionality, and if they are 
encouraged to filter out functional elements during infringement, then they 
will likely gravitate, as they did in copyright cases, to beneficial outcomes. 
